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I. Introduction
In 2003, the Bureau of Reclamation (BuRec) utilized 43 C.F.R. Part 417 
(Part 417)3 to reduce the quantity of water available to a senior California 
water-right holder and increased the quantity available to junior California 
water-right holders.  BuRec's action took place despite a declaration by the 
Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) that the Colorado River was experiencing 
normal flow conditions, and despite that the issue precipitating the 
Secretary's action involved a beneficial-use dispute among California water-
right holders only.  BuRec's action had no potential to impact other 
Colorado River basin states and California's aggregate use was not at issue. 
BuRec conducted an informal adjudication to reallocate the water 
under presumptive federal principles requiring reasonable beneficial use.  In 
doing so, BuRec ignored applicable California water and environmental 
laws, applicable federal environmental laws, historical and continuing 
exercise of jurisdiction by the California State Water Resources Control 
Board (SWRCB), a request by the State of California for formal consultation, 
administrative adjudicatory due process, and the terms of the United States 
contract controlling water delivery. 
This article addresses whether Part 417 authorizes and empowers 
BuRec or the Secretary to act as an adjudicator of intra-state reasonable 
beneficial use of Colorado River water.  The authors conclude that Part 417 
is not authority for agency adjudication; no express preemptive federal 
legislation authorizes the Secretary to render a reasonable beneficial use 
decision without deference to California reasonable beneficial use 
determinations. The Secretary's reallocation of "permanently allocated" 
water disregarded specific conflict-resolution procedures contained in the 
water supply contract between the United States and the Imperial Irrigation 
District, violated federal preemption jurisprudence, and ignored 
Congressional intent and purpose.  The 2003 adjudication and unilateral 
reallocation lacked legal foundation, contract compliance, and adjudicatory 
due process.  Therefore, it should not be regarded as valid precedent. 
A. Water in the West
Today's West is the culmination of over 150 years of water 
development.  The taming of the Colorado River played a major role.  Over 
the span of the twentieth century, a sophisticated water storage and delivery 
network was built to capture and control the entire flow of the Colorado 
River.  Major dams at Glen Canyon and Boulder Canyon harnessed the main 
stem of the Colorado River and a complementary phalanx of projects was 
3. The full text of 43 C.F.R. Part 417 is included as an appendix.
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built deep in the mountain arteries and tributaries of the Colorado River; a 
drainage area totaling one-seventh of the continental United States.4 
This water infrastructure has nurtured a vast and interdependent 
network of agricultural communities and modern cities.  Irrigation districts 
in desert regions of Arizona and California supply water to some of the most 
productive agricultural lands in the world.5  The same combination of sun 
and water created an unstoppable recipe for growth in the major cities of the 
southwest, such as Los Angeles, San Diego, Phoenix, Tucson, and Las Vegas, 
each of which has experienced the largest percentage of national population 
growth for the past decade.6 
The conveyance, utilization and sharing of stored water in the Lower 
Basin of the Colorado River among California, Nevada, and Arizona is highly 
regulated and governed by a combination of contracts and federal, state, 
and local laws.  The California and federal requirement that Colorado River 
water be put to "reasonable beneficial use" provides the starting point to 
evaluate the proper reach of Part 417. 
B. Reasonable Beneficial Use as a Key Concept in Western
Water Law
Western water law evolved to fit the needs of settlers of the dry 
western landscape.  Initially, each state utilized a combination of local rules, 
customs, and laws best suited to meet its own challenges and development 
needs; most commonly to support irrigation and mining activities.  In recent 
years, growing municipal demand has caused increased pressure to 
reallocate supplies from those activities. 
The first disputes over water helped define the concept of a water 
right.7  A user acquired a defensible right to divert and use a quantity of 
water at a certain location for a specific purpose during the year.  When the 
amount of water claimed, diverted and used converged, the right became 
"perfected."  The right was then given a priority8 superior to subsequent, 
4. The Colorado River Basin . . . and Its Plumbing, in WESTERN WATER MADE SIMPLE 155
(Island Press 1987). 
5. MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT 259-60, 333-34 (rev. ed., Penguin Books 1993). 
6. California is projected to grow to 49.2 million from 32.5 million between
2000 and 2025; Arizona is projected to grow to 6.4 from 4.8; and Nevada is projected 
to grow to 2.3 from 1.8 during the same period.  PAUL CAMPBELL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
POPULATION PROJECTIONS: STATES, 1995-2025, at 3 (1997), http://www.census.gov/ 
prod/2/pop/p25/p25-1131.pdf. 
7. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882). 
8. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle, 32
ENVTL. L. 37 (2002); Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient 
Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919 (1998). 
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junior competing users of the same water source.  "First in time, first in 
right" became the shorthand for the rule governing the Doctrine of Prior 
Appropriation, and the principal tenet of state-based water right systems in 
the West. 
The priority system lends predictability and stability to the sharing of a 
finite resource.  When water is abundant, a greater number of junior water 
rights can be satisfied. Conversely, when water is not abundant, the limited 
supply is available first to the senior-most rights holders in descending 
order of priority, so long as their use is "reasonable and beneficial."  That 
senior rights are satisfied before junior rights means that the holders of 
junior rights shoulder the risk of water demand outstripping available supply 
during dry years. 
"Reasonable beneficial use" is the preeminent limitation on the 
exercise of a water right and a "cardinal principle" of western water law.9  
Unlike real property and the concept of fee simple absolute, no water right 
holder possesses an absolute right to water.  Instead, a water right 
guarantees only the use of water, a usufructuary right, constrained by the 
limits of reasonable, beneficial use as defined by each state. 
The concept of reasonable, beneficial use has slowly evolved over time 
in conjunction with the morphing ideals and values of states in the West. 
California's State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) and state courts 
are each expressly empowered to render reasonable, beneficial-use 
determinations.  These determinations are not the result of a formulaic 
approach dependent upon a limited or defined checklist of variables. 
Rather, reasonable, beneficial-use determinations are shaped by a fact-
specific balancing of considerations that are slowly evolving to reflect public 
water policies and pragmatic realities facing existing users. 
C. Colorado River Use and Dependence
The sharing of the Colorado River has been a historic point of tension 
and antagonism among water rights holders in the Lower Basin states of 
Arizona, Nevada and California.  Within California, Colorado River water is a 
pivotal state concern because it is necessary to sustain economic and 
regional population growth. 
On August 18, 1931, a number of existing California Colorado River 
water users — including the Imperial Irrigation District (IID), and several 
prospective users such as the Coachella Valley Water District (CVWD), the 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD), and the City and 
County of San Diego — entered into the "Seven-Party Agreement" to divide 
and share California's right to 4.4million acre-feet (MAF) per year (MAFY) to 
9. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 171 (Ct. App. 1986). 
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the Colorado River. 10 The California Department of Water Resources (DWR) 
recommended the Seven-Party Agreement to the Secretary, who then 
adopted verbatim the allocation and priority provisions of the Seven-Party 
Agreement in BuRec's contract with each of the seven parties.11 
In the recent past, California used as much as 5.2 MAFY of Colorado 
River water, approximately 800,000 AFY in excess of California's maximum 
basic water right to 4.4 MAFY. MWD, the wholesale water supplier to 
millions living in coastal Southern California from San Diego County to 
Ventura County, holds the most junior rights among the members of the 
Seven Party Agreement.  MWD holds almost 550,000 AFY of California's 4.4 
MAFY and was the primary beneficiary of the California's 800,000 AFY of 
excess Colorado River use.  By 2000, 16.9 million people,12 roughly half of 
California's population, depended, at least in part, on Colorado River water 
provided by MWD. 
Reducing MWD's Colorado River supply would require either 
replacement by other in-state sources or a reduction in deliveries to urban 
areas.  The San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA), a member agency of 
MWD, and the largest user of MWD water, perceived itself as more 
vulnerable to MWD supply constraints than other MWD users because its 
rights are junior to other users and because SDCWA has very limited 
alternative local supplies. 
In contrast to MWD and SDCWA, IID holds a large and senior Colorado 
River water right to over 3.1 MAFY of California's agricultural right to 3.85 
MAFY.  Smaller and more senior rights to 400,000 to 500,000 AFY of 
agriculture's 3.85 MAFY belong to the Palo Verde Irrigation District (PVID) 
and the Yuma Project Irrigation District (YPID).  CVWD holds a right junior to 
IID for the balance of the 3.85 MAFY. 
1. IID - A Community Built On Agriculture
The Imperial Valley, located about two hours east of San Diego near 
the Arizona-Mexico border, is one of California's major agricultural regions. 
Farming is the primary economic engine for the area.13  Year-round sunshine 
allows Imperial Valley farmers to grow crops through all four seasons.14  
Much of the land is double and triple-cropped with numerous and diverse 
10. Declaration of Jesse P. Silva in Support of Imperial Irrigation District's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction ¶ 20, Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. United States, No. 03 CV 
0069W (JFS), (S.D. Cal. 2003) [hereinafter Silva Dec.]. 
11. Id.
12. REPORT ON METROPOLITAN’S WATER SUPPLIES app. A, at 2 (March 25, 2003).
13. Silva Dec., supra note 10, ¶ 14.
14. Id.
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field, vegetable, and permanent crops.15  In 2001, for example, over 50 
different crops were commercially grown,16  producing a gross value of 
$1.01 billion.17 
The Imperial Valley has a desert climate with an average rainfall of 
three inches per year.18  All Imperial Valley farmers, businesses, 
municipalities, and residents rely on IID's Colorado River water right.19  The 
combination of little rain, one source of water, and an agricultural economy 
makes a threat to IID's Colorado River right a very serious matter. 
IID delivers water to approximately 450,000 acres of farmland in the 
Imperial Valley (about 703 square miles).20  Distribution of water is 
principally achieved through a gravity-flow system that includes the 82-mile 
All-American Canal, almost 1,700 miles of other delivery canals servicing 
about 6,300 headgates, numerous reservoirs, and over 1,400 miles of 
drainage ditches.21 
2. IID's Long-Established Colorado River Right
Unlike most BuRec contractors, IID's Colorado River water right 
predates its federal contract with the United States by decades.  IID's right 
to appropriate Colorado River water originated in 1885 under California law, 
when a number of individuals and the California Development Company 
made a series of appropriations totaling 7.0 MAFY for use in the Imperial 
Valley.22  The Southern Pacific Company later acquired these water rights.23  
IID was formed in 1911.24  On June22, 1916, the Southern Pacific Company 
conveyed all of its water rights to IID.25  By 1929, at least 424,145 acres of 
the Imperial Valley's approximately one million irrigable acres were 
under irrigation.26 
Under the Seven-Party Agreement, IID agreed to limit its water right in 
quantity and priority to a third priority right in the amount of 3.85 MAFY, 
15. Id.
16. IMPERIAL COUNTY AGRICULTURAL CROP & LIVESTOCK REPORT 3-8 (2001).
17. Silva Dec., supra note 10, ¶ 14.
18. Id. ¶ 13.
19. Id.
20. IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIST., 2005 ANNUAL WATER REPORT 29 (2005), available at
http://www.iid.com/Media/2005IIDWaterAnnualReport.pdf. 
21. Silva Dec., supra note 10, ¶ 10.
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minus Priority 1 and Priority 2 usage, as well as to a sixth and seventh 
priority right for water available to California above 4.4 MAFY.27  Article17 of 
the 1932 contract between IID and the United States obligates the Secretary 
to deliver to IID "so much water as may be necessary to supply the District a 
total quantity . . . in the amounts and with priorities in accordance with 
[those stated in the Seven-Party Agreement]."28 
Upon entering the 1932 contract, IID thought that the Coachella Valley 
would also become a part of IID's service area, even though such lands had 
no historic or pre-existing water right to the Colorado River.29  However, the 
Coachella Valley farmers eventually negotiated their own contract with the 
United States.  In 1934, IID and CVWD executed a Compromise Agreement 
that permitted CVWD to contract directly with the United States, but 
expressly required that CVWD's right to Colorado River water would be 
subordinate in perpetuity to IID's senior right.30  Therefore, within the third, 
sixth and seventh priorities, as set forth in the Seven-Party Agreement and 
all the California right holder water delivery contracts with the United States, 
IID's right to use Colorado River water is senior to CVWD's right.31 
The result of the Seven-Party Agreement water allocations, as 
incorporated into the United States contracts with each party in a 4.4 MAFY 
non-surplus year, is as follows:32 
27. Id. ¶ 21.
28. Id. ¶ 23.
29. Id. ¶ 24.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. ¶ 26.
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Priority Description Annual Acre-feet 
1 Palo Verde Irrigation District—for a gross 
area of 104,500 acres 
2 Yuma Project (Reservation District)—up 
to a gross area of 25,000 acres 
3,850,000 
3a Imperial Irrigation District (senior) 
Coachella Valley Water District (junior) 
3b Palo Verde Irrigation District—for 16,000 
acres of mesa lands 
4 Metropolitan Water District and/or City of 
Los Angeles and/or others on coastal plain    550,000 
SUBTOTAL  4.4 MAFY
When California is limited to 4.4 MAFY, subject to a reasonable, 
beneficial-use requirement, IID may use, and the United States has a 
contractual obligation to deliver, 3.85 MAFY minus amounts used by 
Priorities 1 and 2 (and adjusted pro rata for any use by Palo Verde Irrigation 
District (PVID) under Priority 3b).33  The remainder of the 3.85 MAFY 
agricultural entitlement is available to junior right holder CVWD.  In years 
when California can receive only 4.4 MAF, only 550,000 AF is available to 
junior right holder MWD under the contractual priority agreements.34 
3. Drainage to the Salton Sea
Another important aspect of IID water use is the interrelationship 
between irrigated agriculture in the Imperial Valley and the Salton Sea, 
California's largest lake.  The destruction of wetlands in coastal Southern 
California, as a result of development and the loss of wetlands in the Gulf of 
33. Id. ¶ 28.
34. This ignores some senior miscellaneous and present perfected rights of
smaller users, which reduces MWD's junior right even further.  MWD contends that 
these minor senior rights should reduce the agricultural right of 3.85 MAFY because 
the use is primarily for agriculture.  This dispute was settled by the Quantification 
Settlement Agreement. 
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California in Mexico from Colorado River use, has caused the Salton Sea to 
become the new home for approximately 400 different bird species.  The 
Salton Sea averages between 1.5 million and 2 million water birds per year.35  
The Salton Sea has become an integral component of the Pacific Flyway, 
providing an important migratory stopover for fall and spring shorebirds and 
supporting large populations of wintering waterfowl.  The Salton Sea is only 
one of four remaining interior sites along the Pacific Flyway that supports 
over 100,000 migrating shorebirds.36  Many of the birds that stopover at the 
Salton Sea are listed as endangered or threatened species, or species of 
concern under federal and California endangered species laws.37 
As a terminal lake with farm runoff as the primary source of inflow, the 
Salton Sea exists today only because of irrigated agriculture in the Imperial 
and Coachella Valleys.38  From 1950 to 1999, for example, over 86 percent of 
the Salton Sea's average annual inflow of 1.34 MAF came from Imperial 
Valley irrigation drainage.39  Any reduction in IID water deliveries, or any 
increase in irrigation efficiency that reduces IID irrigation drainage, causes a 
reduction of inflow to the Salton Sea and a corresponding negative 
environmental impact on the species which nest and feed there. 
4. California Exercises Jurisdiction Over IID's
Reasonable Beneficial Use
In the early 1980s, flooding from rising Salton Sea elevations damaged 
certain farmland in IID adjacent to the Salton Sea.  The affected farmer then 
brought a lawsuit against IID to reduce the flooding by reducing Salton Sea 
inflows through forcing higher water use efficiencies.  In 1983, the SWRCB 
held a lengthy evidentiary adjudicatory hearing, in which BuRec participated 
both as a party and as an expert witness.  The SWRCB issued a lengthy 
decision containing detailed factual findings and legal conclusions 
regarding IID's water use and California's requirement for reasonable 
beneficial use, and ordered IID to undertake certain corrective measures. 
Further hearings, an additional decision, and a court order were issued in 
35. IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIST., WATER CONSERVATION AND TRANSFER PROJECT: FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT app. A, at A2-40 
(June 2002). 
36. Id. at A2-41.
37. Id. at A1-11 to -12, A2-54.
38. Id. at A2-13.
39. IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIST., WATER CONSERVATION AND TRANSFER PROJECT AND
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN: DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT § 3.1, at 70 (January 2002); IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIST., supra note 35, at § 1.1. 
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1988.40  The SWRCB retained jurisdiction over IID's reasonable, beneficial 
use and required IID to report semi-annually on its water use(s) and 
improvements to more efficiently deliver and use Colorado River water. In 
Order 88-20, SWRCB mandated IID to implement a conservation project 
sufficient to save at least 100,000 AFY.41  In 1988, IID entered into a long-
term conserved water transfer agreement with MWD.  MWD paid the costs of 
water conservation in exchange for the right to receive the conserved water 
from IID.42 
D. California's 4.4 MAFY Limit Begins to Pinch
Pursuant to the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA),43 the BuRec 
operates the Hoover Dam on the Colorado River and delivers water to 
California right holders consistent with the Seven-Party Agreement 
priorities.  Under normal flow conditions, California right holders are 
entitled to consumptively use 4.4 MAFY.  More is available in surplus years, 
and less in shortage years.  The Secretary declared 2003 a normal flow year.44 
1. California Overuse of Colorado River
Between 1964 and 2002, California use of the Colorado River exceeded 
4.4 MAFY in every year but two.45  California utilized as much as 800,000 AFY 
of surplus and unused entitlement of Nevada and Arizona.  In 1980, Arizona 
passed the landmark Arizona Groundwater Management Act46 to centralize 
management of statewide groundwater resources and to establish 
40. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250, 254-57
(Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 857 (1991). 
41. Imperial Irrigation Dist., Decision 1600, at 69 (Cal. State Water Res. Control
Bd. June 21, 1984), available at http://www.waterrights.ca.gov/hearings/decisions/ 
WRD1600.PDF; Imperial Irrigation Dist., Order WR 88-20, at 44 (Cal. State Water Res. 
Control Bd. Sept. 7, 1988), available at http://www.waterrights.ca.gov/hearings/ 
WaterRightOrders/WRO88-20.pdf. 
42. Imperial Irrigation Dist. & Metro. Water Dist., Agreement for Implementation
of a Water Conservation Program and Use of Conserved Water (1988). 
43. 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617v (2008).
44. Silva Dec., supra note 10, ¶ 27.
45. According to the Bureau of Reclamation’s field office, which manages such
statistics, the exact year that California exceeded 4.4 can only be narrowed to a 
window of time between 1958 and 1964 at which time California was at 5.0 MAF. 
46. The Groundwater Code, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-401 to -704 (2008), was
originally enacted as part of the Groundwater Management Act of 1980, ch. 1, 1980 
Ariz. Sess. Laws, 4th Spec. Sess. § 86. 
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"groundwater banks" to store any portion of its annual 2.8 MAF Colorado 
River entitlement that could not be consumptively used within Arizona in 
any given year.  In 1990, Arizona announced that it was ready to fully utilize 
its 2.8 MAFY share of the Colorado River, putting California on notice that 
its use of Arizona's unused entitlement was about to end.47  During this 
same period, Nevada surpassed its annual Colorado River entitlement of 
300,000 AFY and edged towards 330,000 AFY due to the explosive growth of 
Southern Nevada. 
Today, Nevada and Arizona regularly utilize their full Colorado River 
entitlements.  For over a decade, Nevada and Arizona, along with Colorado, 
New Mexico, Wyoming, Utah, and the BuRec encouraged California to 
reduce its dependency on the unused entitlement of Arizona and Nevada 
and on surplus-flow declarations.48  Such reduction, however, was not easy 
to accomplish. 
2. Interim Surplus Guidelines and the Quantification
Settlement Agreement
Over a few brief years, California's nearly 40-year reliance on up to 
800,000 AFY of Colorado River surplus or unused entitlement entered a 
phasing-out period.  Throughout this period, MWD's sought to gradually 
decrease, over a period of years, its dependence on the unused entitlement 
of Arizona and Nevada and avoid the harsh reality of an abrupt shutoff.49  
Though IID's 1988 conserved-water transfer to MWD added 100,000 AFY to 
MWD's normal year supply, MWD still required an additional 550,000 AFY 
above its normal year entitlement. 
47. James S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on California’s Claims to Water
from the Colorado River Part II: The Development, Implementation and Collapse of California’s Plan 
to Live Within Its Basic Apportionment, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 318, 322-36 (2003). 
48. 43 U.S.C. § 1552 (2008).  Each year, BuRec takes inventory of existing
reservoir levels in its Upper and Lower basin systems and creates an Annual 
Operating Plan (AOP).  It solicits water delivery orders from contractors anticipating 
their annual needs and factors a complex set of interdependent variables such as 
hydropower production, water quality, recreation, fish and wildlife needs, obligations 
to Mexico, and others.  Depending on the final assessment, a pronouncement will 
indicate whether the system will be operated according to “surplus,” “normal,” or 
“shortage” conditions relative to the baseline of 7.5 MAF annual minimum delivery 
for the Lower Basin.  When a surplus exists, the Law of the River has an explicit 
scheme for division of excess waters which favors California.  When the AOP declares 
a normal year, each state is restricted to its maximum portion of water (4.4/2.8/0.3 
MAFY), although California usually benefited from the portion of water that Arizona 
could not put to use. 
49. Lochhead, supra note 47, at 370-79.
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By 1998, a collection of California parties, other Basin States, the 
Secretary, and BuRec began developing the "4.4Plan."  The Plan's goal was to 
voluntarily conserve and transfer for urban use a portion of the Colorado 
River water used by agricultural right holders.50  IID's ability to conserve and 
transfer water was identified as a significant possible new source of urban 
supply to help California live within its 4.4 MAFY limit.  However, a quick 
agreement was not forthcoming. 
In 2001, the Secretary offered California an incentive of "Interim 
Surplus Guidelines"51 (ISG) that would provide California fifteen years to 
ramp down to 4.4 MAFY.52  Through the ISG, the Secretary required 
California's Colorado River contractors to revisit their respective water 
allocations per the 1931 Seven-Party Agreement and devise a Quantification 
Settlement Agreement (QSA) by December31, 2002, to settle their disputes, 
provide for new limits on IID water use, and allow intra-state conserved 
water transfers.  Should the QSA not be executed by December 31, 2002, the 
Secretary reserved the authority to suspend the ISG and immediately limit 
California to 4.4 MAFY. 
The QSA specifically sought to resolve long-standing differences 
between the Seven Party Agreement signors.  The QSA addressed disputes 
between MWD, CVWD, and IID regarding reasonable, beneficial use, the right 
to transfer conserved Colorado River water, the sharing of responsibility for 
required environmental mitigation for conservation and transfer impacts, as 
well as various other disputes. 
SDCWA, responding to the increased risk of a truncated MWD water 
supply, sought to bolster its own water reliability by independently 
acquiring conserved water from IID.53  A transfer of conserved water from IID 
directly to SDCWA, through MWD's conveyance aqueduct, would be based 
upon increased IID irrigation efficiency.54  SDCWA payments to IID would 
allow IID to implement technological and other efficiency improvements. 
SDCWA would reap the benefit of acquiring the saved water (potentially up 
to 300,000 AFY)55 at IID's high senior priority. 
In 2002, the SWRCB issued Order 2002-13, in which it reviewed IID's 
water use in the context of the voluntary conservation and transfer petition 
jointly filed by IID and SDCWA.56  The SWRCB approved IID's request to 
50. Id. at 358.
51. Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 7772 (Jan. 25, 2001). 
52. Lochhead, supra note 47, at 359-65, 390-401.
53. Id. at 322-36.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Imperial Irrigation Dist., Order WRO 2002-13 (Cal. State Water Res. Control
Bd. Oct. 28, 2002). 
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transfer up to 300,000 AFY of conserved water to SDCWA and CVWD, with an 
option for MWD, conditioned on certain environmental safeguards for the 
Salton Sea and other habitats.57  The SWRCB again retained jurisdiction.58  
Throughout 2002, the California Legislature, various state agencies, and 
agricultural, urban, and environmental interests feverishly negotiated the 
terms of a fully consensual QSA.  After the California legislature adopted 
special legislation in September 2002 to allow the taking of a highly-
protected endangered species to facilitate the implementation of the QSA, a 
final push was made to finalize the QSA before the Secretary's December 31, 
2002, deadline. 
3. BuRec's Refusal To Honor IID's 2003 Water Order
In early December of 2002, IID's Board of Directors refused to approve 
the proposed QSA.  IID asserted the QSA imposed unacceptable 
environmental costs and risks on IID and its water users.  The Secretary 
rejected the same QSA as having too many environmental mitigation-
related cancellation provisions.  On December 31, IID and SDCWA approved 
a revised QSA that MWD and CVWD rejected. 
The year drawing to a close, the Secretary declared a normal condition 
on the River for 200359 and announced that California would be limited to a 
maximum of 4.4 MAF in 2003.  The Secretary suspended the ISG60 forcing 
California to deal with an instant water loss of 800,000 AFY. 
The Secretary did not stop there.  The Secretary announced through 
the BuRec that IID's water delivery would also be reduced to a consumptive 
use volume of approximately 2.86 MAF in contrast to IID's requested 
consumptive use of 3.1 MAF.  The Secretary granted the difference of almost 
250,000 AF to junior right holders CVWD and MWD.  BuRec articulated a 
reasonable, beneficial use cap of 2.86 MAFY for IID and relied on 43 C.F.R. 
Part 417 as authority for this intrastate reallocation from a senior right holder 
to two junior right holders.  The letter61 of the Assistant Secretary for Water 
and Science set the reasonable beneficial use cap at a volume based on a 
formulaic application of the Supreme Court Decree in Arizona v. California.62 
57. Id. at 86-87.
58. Id. at 88-94.
59. Lochhead, supra note 47, at 399-400.
60. Id. at 398.
61. Letter from Bennett Raley, Assistant Sec’y of the Interior, to Jesse Silva,
Gen. Manager, Imperial Irrigation Dist. (Dec. 27, 2002) (on file with author and 
Hastings W.-Nw. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y). 
62. Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979).
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The Secretary's cutback of water to IID was an unprecedented use of 
Part 417 and an extraordinary federal intrusion into the province of 
intrastate reasonable beneficial use determinations. 
4. Imperial Irrigation District v. United States (2003)
On January10, 2003, IID filed suit to enjoin the federal reduction and 
challenge the Secretary's authority to unilaterally adjudicate IID's 2003 
Colorado River entitlement.63  IID's complaint alleged that Part 417 was 
adopted in excess of the Secretary's authority,64 and, even if valid, Part 417 
was improperly applied to IID's 2003 water order.65  Importantly, the 
Secretary's authority to limit California to 4.4 MAFY was not challenged. 
The federal district court agreed that IID's contract with the Secretary 
was likely breached by the imposition of the cap identified by the Assistant 
Secretary, and that BuRec had not acted properly under Part 417.  The court 
preliminarily enjoined the federal cutback, but made no final decision on the 
validity, scope, or reach of Part 417.  The court reserved the question of the 
propriety of BuRec authority to make reasonable beneficial use 
adjudications and the validity and legality of Part 417 to future hearings.66 
63. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Imperial Irrigation Dist. v.
United States, No. 03-CV-0069W (JFS) (S.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2003).  Articles contemporary 
to the lawsuit include: David R.E. Aladjem, Reclamation Determines Beneficial Use of Water 
by California’s IID, A.B.A. WATER RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL., August 2003; Michael J. 
Pearce, The Federalization of Beneficial Use, A.B.A. WATER RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL.,
June 2003; David Lindgren, Southern Nevada Water Authority’s Perspective, A.B.A. WATER
RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL., February 2003; Michael Pearce, Arizona Reflections on the 
Suspension of the Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, A.B.A. WATER RESOURCES
COMMITTEE NEWSL., February 2003; Scott Balcomb, Colorado’s View An Upper Basin 
Perspective of California’s Need to Reduce Its Colorado River Water Use, A.B.A. WATER RESOURCES
COMMITTEE NEWSL., February 2003; Jeffrey Kightlinger, California’s Painful Journey to 4.4, 
A.B.A. WATER RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL., February 2003; James Taylor, San Diego’s 
Perspective, A.B.A. WATER RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL., February 2003; John Penn 
Carter, Water Confiscation! Imperial Valley’s New Challenge, A.B.A. WATER RESOURCES
COMMITTEE NEWSL., February 2003. 
64. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 62, at 46.
65. Id. § XII, at 46-47 (Eighth Claim for Relief).
66. Order Remanding Action, Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. United States, No. 03 CV
0069W(JFS) (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2003); Order re: Clarification, Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. 
United States, No. 03 CV 0069W(JFS) (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2003). 
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5. BuRec's De Novo 43 C.F.R. Part 417 Determination
After the preliminary injunction halted the reduction in water 
deliveries to IID, BuRec requested and received district court permission to 
conduct a de novo Part 417 review.67  For the first time, BuRec extensively 
adjudicated IID's requested water order for calendar year 2003 under the 
Part 417 reasonable, beneficial-use standards. 
The Regional Director issued a decision on August 29, 2003, in which 
he concluded that IID, which had ordered 3.1 MAF in 2003, needed only 2.84 
MAF for reasonable, beneficial use.  Volumes above that were deemed 
wasteful.68  By identifying volumes above 2.84 MAF as wasteful, BuRec 
denied IID the benefit of its senior water right and authorized the wasted 
water to be reallocated to junior water rights holders, CVWD and MWD, 
without charge.69  The preliminary injunction, however, precluded BuRec's 
decision from being implemented. 
IID submitted to BuRec the administrative record from the 2002 
SWRCB proceeding, as well as substantial volumes of other evidence. 
BuRec, however, reached its Part 417 reasonable, beneficial-use decision70 
independent of and without consideration of the 2002 SWRCB water transfer 
approval.  BuRec ignored the prior SWRCB decision which allowed IID's 
conserved water to be transferred to SDWCA under California law in 
exchange for payments from SDWCA to IID to fund environmental mitigation 
and conservation costs.  BuRec also ignored the SWRCB specific 
requirements for environmental mitigation as a condition to the 
conservation and transfer.  BuRec held no hearings, allowed no discovery by 
IID, and allowed no cross-examination by IID of BuRec experts. 
BuRec specifically ignored the costs of proposed IID efficiency 
improvements, the costs of SWRCB-imposed environmental mitigation, and 
failed to consider or discuss the link between IID conservation activity and 
67. Federal Defendants' Brief re Remedy for 43 C.F.R. Part 417 Breach Found
by Court on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 
No. 03 CV 0069W (JFS) (S.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2003). 
68. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, LOWER COLORADO REGION,
PART 417 REGIONAL DIRECTOR’S FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND DETERMINATIONS, IMPERIAL 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, CALENDAR YEAR 2003 59 (Aug. 29, 2003), available at 
http://www.imperialgroup.info/PDF/417FinalRec.pdf. 
69. Coincidentally, the amount of water gained by MWD through this federal
review was approximately the exact same amount MWD was in jeopardy of losing as 
a result of California’s reduction of Colorado River water in excess of 4.4 MAFY. 
70. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, LOWER COLORADO REGION,
PART 417 REGIONAL DIRECTOR’S INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND DETERMINATIONS, IMPERIAL
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, CALENDAR YEAR 2003 (July 2, 2003); see also U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, supra note 68. 
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environmental impacts.  Relying on the alleged authority of Part 417, BuRec 
adjudged that IID was inefficiently irrigating and thus wasting water in 
violation of the reasonable, beneficial-use requirement in IID's federal 
contract for water delivery.  BuRec thus negated the SWRCB-authorized 
transfer of conserved water. 
IID appealed BuRec's Part417 decision to the Secretary, and ultimately 
would have sought judicial review in the pending lawsuit.  The appeal was 
rendered moot and the IID litigation dismissed after the QSA was further 
negotiated, revised and finally executed on October10, 2003. 
The district court never ruled upon the validity and use of Part 417 
as applied in 2003.  It remains an open legal question and the focus of 
this article. 
II. Federal Preemption of California Reasonable Beneficial Use
Law or Jurisdiction is Not Warranted
The legitimate role for Part 417 depends upon whether the Secretary 
can trump California authority to make reasonable beneficial use 
determinations for Colorado River water to be used entirely within California 
and within California's 4.4 MAFY right.  BuRec relied solely on Part 417 as 
authority for the alleged exclusive federal right to make reasonable, 
beneficial-use determinations.  California constitutional, statutory, common 
and administrative law governing reasonable, beneficial use was totally 
ignored.  The legal question is whether a federal contract requiring 
reasonable, beneficial use coupled with Part 417 preempts California 
reasonable beneficial use law and jurisdiction.71 
A. Doctrinal Framework for Preemption Analysis
Three types of preemption analyses are available to evaluate the 
interrelationship of federal and California law: express preemption; field 
preemption; and conflict preemption.72 
71. An alternative statutory construction analysis is also warranted, and in the
view of the authors, leads to the same conclusion.  See infra note 78. 
72. Of inestimable help in understanding the framework and proper structural
analysis of preemption analysis: Amy K. Kelley, Staging a Comeback—Section 8 of the 
Reclamation Act, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 97 (1984) [hereinafter Kelley, Staging a Comeback]; 
Roderick Walston, Reborn Federalism in Western Water Law: The New Melones  
Decision, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1645 (1979); Amy K. Kelley, Federal Preemption and State   
Water Law, 105 J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 4 (1996) [hereinafter Kelley,   
Federal Preemption and State Water Law], http://www.ucowr.siu.edu/updates/pdf/ 
V105_A2.pdf#search='Amy%20K.%20Kelley'. 
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Express preemption arises in the context of Congressional legislation 
that unambiguously asserts federal authority and expressly prohibits state 
activity in a particular legal domain.73  State regulation within the federally-
legislated domain is expressly forbidden and all enforcement authority is 
completely consolidated within federal control.74 
Field preemption is similarly based on an express or "dominant" 
federal interest,75 but involves an implied intent to "occupy the field"76 rather 
than the express prohibition of state activity. 
Conflict preemption examines whether specific provisions of federal 
law conflict with state law.  State law that is in direct conflict with, 
inconsistent with, or frustrates the implied intent and purpose of 
Congressional action is nullified by the federal law77 if it cannot be 
reconciled with the federal purpose.78 
Congress has neither expressly preempted a role for the states in 
reasonable beneficial use determinations for intrastate use of Colorado 
River water nor specifically enacted any federal program to occupy the field 
of reasonable beneficial use adjudications for intrastate use of Colorado 
River water.  To the contrary, the savings clause of section 8 of the 
Reclamation Act expressly preserves state authority: 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or 
intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of 
any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, 
use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any 
vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the 
Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall 
proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein 
shall in any way affect any right of any State or of the 
Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or 
user of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or the 
waters thereof.79 
73. Kelley, Federal Preemption and State Water Law, supra note 72, at 5.
74. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 384-85 (2d ed. 2005).
75. Kelley, Federal Preemption and State Water Law, supra note 72, at 5.
76. Id.
77. A prime example of field preemption is federal control of nuclear regulation. 
78. Kelley, Federal Preemption and State Water Law, supra note 72, at 6.
79. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (2008).  This specific Congressional directive to the
Secretary to "proceed in conformity" with the laws of the states relating to the use of 
water used in irrigation negates any implied authority of the Secretary to issue 
regulations for the use of irrigation water inconsistent with state laws or to ignore 
state laws or state's rights.  Furthermore, the general powers of the Secretary 
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Neither the Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA) nor any other 
subsequent Congressional legislation or law regarding the Colorado River 
expressly or impliedly preempts applicable state reasonable beneficial use 
law.  Thus, a federal reasonable beneficial use determination preempts state 
law only if a conflict preemption analysis reveals an irreconcilable conflict 
between a federal purpose and state law.  Without a clear conflict, California 
reasonable, beneficial-use decisions and control remain valid and beyond 
federal preemption. 
B. Federal Reasonable Beneficial Use Authorities
1. Presumptions of Federal Supremacy and
Deference to States
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution reserves to 
Congress the authority to preempt state law.80  Both the Commerce Clause81 
and the Property Clause82 establish a fundamental foundation and context 
for federal authority, should Congress decide to exercise its power.  The two 
prominent examples of Congressional preemption of state supremacy in the 
water law context, distinct from reclamation law, are navigational servitudes 
and federal reserved water rights.83 
Three years before passage of the Reclamation Act in 1902, United States 
v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.84 addressed whether the federal government
had the power to limit the building of a dam (near the present day Elephant
Butte Dam in New Mexico) if the construction of the dam would impact and
limit the downstream navigability of the Rio Grande.85  The court traced the
roots of federal authority in the realm of water rights to a "preexisting right
of possession" under state authority.86  This essential context solidified the
authorized by § 10 of the Reclamation Act are subservient to the specific restrictions 
of § 8 under common principles of statutory construction that the more specific 
statutory language prevails over the more general language.  The Rehnquist opinion 
in California v. Arizona, discussed infra, appears to rely on this analytical approach of 
statutory construction. 
80. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
81. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
82. Id. at art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
83. "Although this power of changing the common-law rule as to streams
within its dominion undoubtedly belongs in each state, yet two limitations must be 
recognized." United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899). 
84. Id.
85. Id. at 702.
86. It is the established doctrine of this court that rights of
miners . . . and for purposes of agricultural irrigation, in the region
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premise of state sovereignty over water resources; yet, the basis for 
preemptive federal authority was the express reserved authority of Congress 
to ensure the integrity of the waterways which served as the "natural 
highways" of interstate commerce.87  The federal commerce authority and 
control over navigable waterways preempted state law. 
A second non-reclamation case, United States v. New Mexico,88 addressed 
whether the United States reserved any water right for federal purposes at 
the time it created the Gila National Forest in 1899.89  Of paramount 
importance was the distinction between express and implied Congressional 
intent and the limits to implied intent if any was found.90  The Supreme 
Court confirmed federal preemption over state water rights regimes by 
concluding that Congress had expressly created the national forest and 
attached an implied reservation of a water right necessary to accomplish the 
express federal purpose.91  But, the Supreme Court struck down a U.S. Forest 
Service claim to water beyond the express Congressional purpose of timber 
preservation.  Other uses of the National Forests, such as recreation, 
aesthetics, wildlife preservation, or cattle grazing, not expressly identified in 
the legislation establishing the Gila National Forest, did not warrant an 
implied federal preemption of state law for procuring water supplies.92  The 
where such artificial use of the water was an absolute necessity, 
are rights which the government had, by its conduct, recognized 
and encouraged, and was bound to protect, before the passage of 
the act of 1866.  We are of opinion that the section of the act which 
we have quoted was rather a voluntary recognition of a preexisting 
right of possession, constituting a valid claim to its continued use, 
than the establishment of a new one. 
Id. at 705. 
87. [I]t is limited by the superior power of the general government to
secure the uninterrupted navigability of all navigable streams
within the limits of the United States.  In other words, the
jurisdiction of the general government over interstate commerce
and its natural highways vests in that government the right to take
all needed measures to preserve the navigability of the navigable
water courses of the country, even against any state action.
Id. at 703. 
88. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
89. Id. at 698.
90. Id.
91. "[W]ater is frequently necessary to achieve the purposes for which these
reservations are made.  But Congress has seldom expressly reserved water for use on 
these withdrawn lands."  Id. at 699. 
92. Recreational, aesthetic, and wildlife preservation uses.
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Supreme Court unambiguously curtailed the implied authority to displace 
state water law93 beyond the expressed purposes articulated in a given 
federal act. 
2. Federal Statutes and Interstate Agreements
The Supreme Court's admonition that conditions imposed by a state 
are invalid if inconsistent with congressional directives provides a threshold 
question of preemption.94  The inquiry of the conflict preemption analysis is 
to determine the scope and purpose of express congressional directives that 
pertain to reasonable, beneficial use and the role of the Secretary regarding 
the Colorado River. 
Federal authority for the control and use of the Lower Colorado River 
originates in the 1902 Reclamation Act and the subsequent 1928 Boulder 
Canyon Project Act (BCPA).  Upon these two federal statutes rests a unique 
cluster of arrangements — including an interstate compact, federal 
regulations, water delivery contracts and Supreme Court decisions and 
decrees — collectively referred to as the "Law of the River."95 
a. Reclamation Act (1902)
Congress launched federal involvement in the water reclamation 
business with the landmark Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902.96  Western 
states envisioned reclaiming the predominately dry lands west of the 100th 
93. A particularly interesting footnote within a footnote is the fact that New
Mexico was decided on the same day as California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), 
and both were written by [future, now deceased] Chief Justice William Rehnquist as 
an Associate Justice. 
94. United States v. California, 694 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1982).
95. Understanding the Law of the River requires a grasp of the history, actors,
and phases of litigation beyond the possible scope of a single paper.  Excellent 
introductory resources are: Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(1966); James S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on California’s Claims to Water from 
the Colorado River Part I: The Law of the River, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 290 (2001); Kara 
Gillon, Watershed Down?: The Ups and Downs of Watershed Management in the Southwest, 5 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 395 (2002); Warren Abbott, California Colorado River Issues, 19 PAC.
L.J. 1391 (1988); Gary Weatherford, Decree Enforcement Comes into the Law of the River: Cross 
Currents in Cutting California to 4.4 MAFY, 49 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 8-1 (2003); 
Lochhead, supra note 47; Robert Glennon & Peter Culp, The Last Green Lagoon: How and 
Why the Bush Administration Should Save the Colorado River Delta, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 903 (2002). 
96. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.). 
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meridian through massive irrigation projects.97  However, this vision required 
federal funding to make the infrastructure projects financially feasible. 
Section 8 of the Reclamation Act reserves state authority over water 
resources.98  It also provides, "[t]he right to the use of water acquired under 
the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and 
beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right."99  Each state 
was limited by the federal requirement that federal reclamation waters could 
only be distributed for beneficial uses; but this limitation was lifted directly 
from existing state law.  No explicit enunciation of any separate federal 
standard of reasonable, beneficial use accompanied the statute.  Thus, the 
meaning of reasonable, beneficial use remained with each state, for which 
the requirement already existed. 
Section 10 of the Reclamation Act authorized the Secretary "to perform 
any and all acts and to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary 
and proper for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act into full 
force and effect."100  This express regulatory authority is not itself sufficient 
to create a conflict with state reasonable, beneficial use laws.  Under the New 
Mexico holding, federal regulations do not preempt state law unless such 
regulations carry out the express purposes of the Act and are necessary to 
fulfill that federal purpose.  A general power to adopt necessary and 
proper regulations creates no basis for finding conflict with a pre-existing 
state role and no authority in defining and enforcing intrastate reasonable, 
beneficial use. 
The Reclamation Act of 1902 provides no support for conflict 
preemption.  The express beneficial use limitation on the right to use 
reclamation project water is imposed without federal definition and without 
any identified federal process for making reasonable, beneficial use 
decisions.  Accordingly, the requirement does not create an express conflict 
with any state law that defines or limits water rights to reasonable, 
beneficial use, even when such state law also includes substantive 
definitions and dispute resolution and enforcement procedures. 
b. Colorado River Compact (1922)
Congress authorized construction and operation of federal projects 
through the Department of the Interior (Interior) and BuRec.  In conjunction 
with federal support, many states successfully developed surface water 
97. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 648 (1978).
98. Reclamation Act § 8.  Note that the utilization of Part 417 regarding IID
also requires recognition that IID's water rights to the Colorado River were first 
obtained under state law prior to any reclamation project involvement. 
99. 43 U.S.C. § 372 (2008) (emphasis added).
100. 43 U.S.C. § 373 (2008).
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supplies on large interstate rivers.  In an important early precedent, the 
Supreme Court declared that as between states with similar prior 
appropriation water-rights systems, priority established by "first in time, first 
in right" was without regard to a fixed or guaranteed portion of water for 
users in different states.101 
The prior appropriation system which protected senior users from 
junior users within each state was extended at an interstate level.  This 
immediately fueled rivalry among states and raised concerns about relative 
rates of growth and the prospect of permanent state-level loss of 
undeveloped water.  If an entire river was put to beneficial use by a 
downstream state before an upstream state utilized any water, the slower 
developing state could legally be deprived of all use of water which passed 
through it. 
The Upper Basin Colorado River States determined that proactive 
steps were necessary to prevent California, the fastest growing Basin State, 
from establishing priority through prior appropriation to all or most of the 
Colorado River.  The Colorado River Compact (Compact) divided the waters 
of the Colorado into "Upper"102 and "Lower"103 Basins and decoupled the 
prior appropriation system between the two basins.  The Upper Basin was 
freed from pressure to develop its waters or risk losing them in perpetuity to 
the ascendant California. 
However, the Compact did not partition rights to the Colorado River 
between the states of each basin.  The Lower Basin States of Arizona, 
Nevada, and California had to determine how to fairly split their collective 
7.5 MAFY among themselves.  The Compact referenced that the volumes 
were for beneficial use only.  However, it provided no illuminating detail and 
omitted any clarifying or common definition in regard to reasonable, 
beneficial use.  The absence of such language prevents any interpretive 
insight into later federal legislation which incorporated the Compact's 
beneficial use requirement. 
c. Boulder Canyon Project Act (1928)
California enjoyed the use of the Colorado River for agriculture in the 
Imperial Valley long before the 1902 Reclamation Act was passed.  However, 
intermittent flooding and abundant seasonal sediment which damaged 
irrigation projects combined with the issue of Mexico's water claims to 
escalate pressure on Congress for local Imperial infrastructure support, 
culminating in the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA).104 
101. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
102. Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico, and Utah.
103. California, Arizona, and Nevada.
104. 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617v (2008).
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Section 1 identifies the BCPA's express purposes: flood control, 
navigation and water regulation, and the reclamation of public lands 
(irrigation).105  Electrical energy production is an additional, but subordinate, 
purpose.106  Section 1 expressly references "beneficial use" as the limit on 
the use of reclamation water, but omits any substantive definition of 
reasonable, beneficial use or any process for federal determination of 
reasonable, beneficial use.107  Instead, section 1 outlines the scope of 
Secretarial authority to "construct, operate, and maintain a dam and 
incidental works in the main stream" of the River and a "main canal and 
appurtenant structures."108  It primarily describes the Secretary as a builder 
and operator of infrastructure rather than as a regulator or adjudicator of the 
reasonable, beneficial use requirement. 
Section 4(a) of the BCPA divides the Lower Basin apportionment of 7.5 
MAFY among California, Arizona, and Nevada109 and details the 
contingencies necessary for ratifying the Colorado River Compact.110  Lower 
Basin states cannot withhold water from each other under a standard of 
reasonable application [of water] to domestic and agricultural uses.  The 
1922 Compact is referenced as the standard for reasonable application to 
which all three states are bound.111  However, as mentioned above, the 
Compact is notably silent as to any definition or process for determining 
"reasonable application."  Section 4(a) is also silent as to any role for the 
Secretary in the adjudication, dispute resolution, or enforcement of the 
reasonable application requirement.  Responsibility is placed on the three 
Lower Basin States to "mutually agree" on reasonable applications of water.112 
Congress conditioned enactment of the BCPA on approval by 
California's legislature of an express and firm limitation to a maximum right 
to 4.4 MAFY of the Colorado River.113  In addition, the BCPA had to be 
ratified by six of the seven Upper and Lower Basin States.114  In the event 
that one of the Lower Basin States other than California refused to ratify the 




109. Id. § 617c(a).  Arizona: 2.8 MAFY; California: 4.4 MAFY; Nevada: 300,000
AFY.  An acre-foot is just under 327,000 gallons or the amount of water it takes to 
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partition, Congress authorized the Secretary to operate, distribute, and 
allocate the River's waters in the same fixed proportion.115 
Section 5 of the BCPA authorized the Secretary to prescribe 
regulations "to contract for the storage of water in said reservoir and for the 
delivery thereof at such points on the river and on said canal as may be 
agreed upon" so that the costs of construction, operation, and maintenance 
can be recouped by the federal government.116  Section 5 also contains a 
provision indicating that all contracts for irrigation and domestic purposes 
"shall be for permanent service . . . ."117  Contracts must conform with section 
4(a) and "[n]o person shall have or be entitled to have the use for any 
purpose of the water stored as aforesaid except by contract . . . ."118 
Section 5 makes no reference to reasonable, beneficial use.  The 
Secretarial regulations referenced are for the purpose of entering into 
permanent contracts with users and for managing storage, delivery points, 
and assuring federal financial recoupment.  The permanence of all contracts 
strongly undercuts any hint of a Secretarial role to deny water deliveries or 
reallocate water inconsistent with permanent contractual priority.  Similar to 
section 10 of the Reclamation Act, section 5 authorizes the Secretary to 
issue regulations for contracts for storage and delivery of Colorado River 
water.  But, the context of the section 5 authority is for the Secretary to issue 
regulations for the purpose of entering storage and delivery contracts.  No 
express authority instructs the Secretary to make either annual intrastate 
water use allocations or annual reasonable beneficial use adjudications. 
The full extent of the section 5 contracting authority is properly framed by 
the pragmatic federal interest to recoup infrastructure costs and ensure that 
no state exceeds its legal maximum. 
Section 6 cements the controlling purposes and priorities of the BCPA. 
It prioritizes the purposes of use of the dam and reservoir listed in section 1: 
river regulation, improvement of navigation and flood control, irrigation and 
domestic uses, "satisfaction of present perfected rights in pursuance of 
Article VIII of said Colorado River compact," and power production.119  Title, 
control, management, and operation of the dams are expressly stipulated to 
remain with the federal government120 and the general focus of the federal 
role is on the maintenance and operation of the physical waterworks. 
Section 14 coordinates the BCPA with the Reclamation Act, which is 
expressly recognized as the primary law controlling "the construction, 
115. Id.
116. Id. § 617d.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. § 617e.
120. Id.
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operation, and management" of the BCPA infrastructure, "except as 
otherwise herein provided."121 
Similarly, section 18 reaffirms the savings clause language of section 8 
of the Reclamation Act, articulating federal recognition of state rights 
specific to appropriation, control, and use of intrastate waters.122  
Importantly, nothing in the BCPA abrogates the savings clause of section 8 
of the Reclamation Act. 
The BCPA contains no federal definition of reasonable, beneficial use 
and does not identify any federal procedure to adjudicate reasonable, 
beneficial use.  There is no identified federal purpose and no necessity to 
supplant state reasonable, beneficial use law, nor is there any language that 
suggests a conflict with a continuing state role in reasonable, beneficial use 
decisions.  Instead, section 4 and section 18 reaffirm congressional intent to 
limit the federal role pertaining to reasonable, beneficial use and 
congressional preference for state law dominion. 
The BCPA allowed California, with no Colorado tributary water of its 
own, 4.4 MAFY plus half of any surplus and all unused entitlement by either 
Arizona or Nevada.  Arizona challenged the quantification of how its 
tributary water would be accounted for in the broader formula.  If the Gila 
River was included as part of Arizona's 2.8 MAFY entitlement, Arizona would 
only gain a secure right to 1.0 MAF of the Colorado River's main stem 
waters.  The differential of 1.8 MAF would allow California a perpetual right 
to an additional 900,000 AF (roughly the same amount of extra water that 
MWD used in the recent past and close to the volume of Priority 5 under the 
Seven-Party Agreement).  Arizona believed it was being shortchanged to 
California's benefit and refused to ratify the BCPA. 
Even without Arizona's ratification, section 4(a) of the BCPA expressly 
authorized the Secretary to operate the Boulder Canyon Dam and distribute 
the waters of the Colorado in accordance with the Congressional allocation, 
if California ratified the 4.4 MAFY limit and five of the other six basin states 
ratified the BCPA.  California's legislature ratified the BCPA 4.4 MAFY limit 
in 1929 with the passage of the California Limitation Act123 and the BCPA 
shortly thereafter became law. 
121. Id. § 617m.
122. Nothing herein shall be construed as interfering with such rights
as the States now have either to the waters within their borders or
to adopt such policies and enact such laws as they may deem
necessary with respect to the appropriation, control, and use of
waters within their borders, except as modified by the Colorado
River compact or other interstate agreement.
Id. § 617q (emphasis added). 
123. California “Limitation Act,” ch. 16, 1929 Cal. Stat. 38-39, 48th Sess.
 
West  Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2008 
1525 
3. Judicial Construction and the Law of the River
The term "cooperative federalism" has been used to define the 
oscillating balance between state and federal control of intrastate water 
resources.  An early string of U.S. Supreme Court cases124 established a 
presumption of federal deference to state control over water resources, but 
in 1958, Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken125 reversed course and signaled a 
new period of federal encroachment upon state sovereignty. 
a.  Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken
Section 5 of the Reclamation Act expressly limits the use of 
Reclamation water on irrigated acreage under single ownership to 160 acres. 
California law did not recognize the same limitation on irrigated acreage.126 
The lead issue in Ivanhoe was whether section 5 of the Reclamation Act 
preempted California law. The California Supreme Court declared section 5 
unconstitutional and invalidated the federally imposed acreage 
limitations.127  The U.S. Supreme Court overruled the California high court, 
holding that Congress's express limitation and specific language in section 
5 preempted a contrary state law.128  It was a clear case of conflict 
preemption where state law could not be reconciled with a conflicting 
express federal purpose. 
However, the Ivanhoe decision included critical dicta that tinted 
subsequent interpretation of section8 of the Reclamation Act and triggered 
the beginning of a dramatic erosion of state authority.129  Previous deference 
124. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 295 U.S. 40 (1935); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589
(1945); U.S. v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950). 
125. 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
126. Id. at 277-79.
127. Id. at 278-79.
128. We do not suggest that where Congress has provided a system
of regulation for federal projects it must give way before an
inconsistent state system.'  Section 5 is a specific and mandatory
prerequisite laid down by the Congress as binding in the
operation of reclamation projects, providing that '[n]o right to the
use of water . . . shall be sold for a tract exceeding one hundred
and sixty acres to any one landowner.
Id. at 291-92 (alteration in original) (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945)). 
129. We believe this erroneous insofar as the substantive provisions
of § 5 of the 1902 Act are concerned.  As we read § 8, it merely
requires the United States to comply with state law when, in the
construction and operation of a reclamation project, it becomes
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to state law in the domain of water supply management and water rights 
regulation was fractured by a new distinction between the acquisition of 
water rights, which were not impacted by reclamation law and which were 
still governed by state law, and the operation and delivery of Reclamation 
water, which was now subject to inconsistent state imposed conditions.130  
While California maintained exclusive jurisdiction over appropriation and 
allocation of water rights, it was no longer able to control or condition the 
federal use or delivery of that water once the federal government acquired a 
right to use water for reclamation purposes. 
b.  City of Fresno v. California
In 1963, City of Fresno v. California131 addressed whether Fresno could 
enjoin the United States from diverting surface water for irrigation purposes 
in contravention of two California laws that expressed a preference for 
municipal uses over irrigation purposes and a preference for use of water 
within its county of origin.132 
Like the decision in Ivanhoe, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on express 
Congressional language prioritizing reclamation water for irrigation133 over 
other uses, in overruling the conflicting California preference for municipal 
water.  Fresno further eroded federal deference to state law by affirming the 
dictum of the Ivanhoe decision and then by restricting state authority in 
limiting or conditioning federal acquisition of water rights.134  The second lever 
of state authority over water resources was taken away. 
necessary for it to acquire water rights or vested interests therein. 
But the acquisition of water rights must not be confused with the 
operation of federal projects…We read nothing in § 8 that compels 
the United States to deliver water on conditions imposed by the 
State.  To read § 8 to the contrary would require the Secretary to 
violate § 5, the provisions of which, as we shall see, have been 
national policy for over half a century. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
130. Walston, supra note 72, at 1666-68.
131. 372 U.S. 627 (1963).
132. Id. at 628.
133. "No contract relating to municipal water supply or miscellaneous
purposes shall be made unless, in the judgment of the Secretary [of the Interior], it 
will not impair the efficiency of the project for irrigation purposes."  Reclamation 
Project Act of 1939, ch. 418, § 9(c), 53 Stat. 1187, 1194 (current version at 43 U.S.C. 
§ 485h(c) (2003)).
134. However, § 8 does not mean that state law may operate to
prevent the United States from exercising the power of eminent
domain to acquire the water rights of others . . . . Rather, the effect 
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c.  Arizona v. California (1963)
As previously noted, Arizona did not ratify the BCPA apportionment of 
the Lower Colorado and sued California to exclude the Gila River from the 
Colorado River water accounting scheme. 
The Colorado River Compact divided the waters between the Upper 
and Lower Basins; the BCPA divided the waters among California, Arizona, 
and Nevada; and the litigation in Arizona v. California135 resolved substantial 
issues as to how the accounting for water allocation would be 
implemented.136  A closely divided Supreme Court (5-3; Chief Justice Warren 
did not participate) determined that equitable apportionment did not 
govern allocation of the Colorado River since the BCPA was an express 
comprehensive Congressional scheme governing interstate 
apportionment.137  The primary holding divided the river in a 4.4/2.8/0.3 ratio 
among California, Arizona, and Nevada respectively, and excluded the 
tributary flow of the Gila River from Arizona's 2.8 MAFY.138  Arizona had won. 
The Arizona decision also resolved an important secondary issue 
regarding the extent to which the Secretary was bound by state law when 
entering into contracts to allocate and distribute the waters of the Colorado 
River with contractors of each state.  Most importantly for understanding the 
present Part 417 contention, the Supreme Court examined the Secretary's 
section 5 contract authority through the provisions of sections 14 and 18 of 
the BCPA and section 8 of the Reclamation Act to determine if state law 
could limit the Secretary's ability to enter the congressionally-required water 
delivery contracts.139  The Arizona Court held that the BCPA authorized the 
of § 8 in such a case is to leave to state law the definition of the 
property interests, if any, for which compensation must be made. 
Fresno, 372 U.S. at 630. 
135. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
136. An essential reference is Charles J. Meyers’ The Colorado River, supra note 95.
137. 373 U.S. at 560, 575-90.
138. Id. at 592-93.
139. Nor does § 18 of the Project Act require the Secretary to contract
according to state law.  That Act was passed in the exercise of
congressional power to control navigable water for purposes of
flood control, navigation, power generation, and other objects,
and is equally sustained by the power of Congress to promote the
general welfare through projects for reclamation, irrigation, or
other internal improvements.  Section 18 merely preserves such
rights as the States 'now' have, that is, such rights as they had at
the time the Act was passed.  While the States were generally free
to exercise some jurisdiction over these waters before the Act was
passed, this right was subject to the Federal Government's right to
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Secretary to implement the interstate water apportionment exclusively 
through water delivery contracts and these contracts were to be the sole 
method for contractors to acquire waters impounded behind the federal 
dams on the Lower Colorado River. 
The Court affirmed that the BCPA expressly incorporated Reclamation 
Law, which itself recognized that state law governed the "control, 
appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation."  However, 
Ivanhoe and Fresno emerged as prominent authority within Arizona140 to 
expansively strip states of regulatory authority over water allocation and 
distribution from the Colorado River, previously and expressly conferred by 
the Reclamation Act.  The Supreme Court relied on Ivanhoe for the 
proposition that the federal government was not bound by state law in 
delivering or distributing reclamation water141 and held that the Secretary "in 
choosing between users within each State and in settling the terms of his 
contracts is not bound . . . to follow state law."142  The Supreme Court 
regulate and develop the river.  Where the Government, as here, 
has exercised this power and undertaken a comprehensive project 
for the improvement of a great river and for the orderly and beneficial 
distribution of water, there is no room for inconsistent state laws.  As in 
Ivanhoe, where the general provision preserving state law was held 
not to override a specific provision stating the terms for 
disposition of the water, here we hold that the general saving 
language of § 18 cannot bind the Secretary by state law and thereby nullify 
the contract power expressly conferred upon him by § 5.  Section 18 plainly 
allows the States to do things not inconsistent with the Project Act or with 
federal control of the river, for example, regulation of the use of 
tributary water and protection of present perfected rights.  What 
other things the States are free to do can be decided when the 
occasion arises. But where the Secretary's contracts, as here, carry out a 
congressional plan for the complete distribution of waters to users, state law has 
no place. 
373 U.S. at 587-88 (emphasis added). 
140. Id. at 546.
141. "Since § 8 of the Reclamation Act did not subject the Secretary to state
law in disposing of water in that case, we cannot, consistently with Ivanhoe, hold 
that the Secretary must be bound by state law in disposing of water under the Project 
Act."  Id. at 587. 
142. Section 14 provides that the reclamation law, to which the Act is
made a supplement, shall govern the management of the works
except as otherwise provided, and § 8 of the Reclamation Act,
much like § 18 of the Project Act, provides that it is not to be
construed as affecting or interfering with state laws 'relating to the
control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in
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emphasized that "where the Secretary's contracts, as here, carry out a 
congressional plan for the complete distribution of waters to users, state law 
has no place."143  State law could not impede congressional intent or limit 
the Secretary's contracting authority. 
Justice Black linked the fundamental Congressional objective of 
section 5 with the concern that Arizona would not accept the federally 
outlined and "suggested" apportionment among states.144  Congress 
expressly imposed its own "statutory apportionment" formula for division of 
waters among the states and expressly authorized the Secretary to apportion 
waters among Lower Basin States according to section 4(a) of the BCPA145 
and to allocate each state portion among users.146 
Evaluating the extent and limit on the Secretary's section 5 
contracting authority, the Supreme Court stated, "authority is no less than 
the general authority, unless Congress has placed some limit on it."147  
Justice Black concluded: 
[there is] no phrase or provision indicating that the 
Secretary's contract power was to be controlled by the law 
of prior appropriation was substituted either then or at 
any other time before passage of the Act, and we are 
persuaded that had Congress intended so to fetter the 
Secretary's discretion, it would have done so in clear and 
unequivocal terms, as it did in recognizing "present 
perfected rights" in § 6.148 
irrigation . . . .'  In our view, nothing in any of these provisions 
affects our decision, stated earlier, that it is the Act and the 
Secretary's contracts, not the law of prior appropriation, that control the 
apportionment of water among the States.  Moreover, contrary to 
the Master's conclusion, we hold that the Secretary in choosing 
between users within each State and in settling the terms of his 
contracts is not bound by these sections to follow state law. 
Id. at 585-86 (emphasis added) (brackets in original). 
143. Id. at 588.
144. Id. at 579.
145. 4.4/2.8/0.3 MAFY for each state respectively.
146. "Congress made sure, however, that if the States did not agree on any
compact the objects of the Act would be carried out, for the Secretary would then 
proceed, by making contracts, to apportion water among the States and to allocate 
the water among users within each State."  373 U.S. at 579 (emphasis added). 
147. Id. at 580.
148. Id. at 581.
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Justice Black summarized the BCPA as giving the Secretary sufficient 
power to permanently allocate water "among states and among users within 
each State without regard to the law of prior appropriation."149  Concluding 
the section of his analysis titled "ALLOCATION OF WATER AMONG THE 
STATES AND DISTRIBUTION TO USERS,"150 he framed the scope of federal 
interests within the concept of cooperative federalism.  In taking 
responsibility for the harnessing of the Colorado River through a "great 
complex" of public works, the United States had an underlying interest to 
"make certain that the waters were effectively used."  The "vast, interlocking 
machinery" could only function under unitary federal management, which 
was uniquely capable of synthesizing and coordinating the competitive 
interests of the states.151  The Secretary was thus empowered to operate this 
machinery and contract in such a way as to avoid the "possibly inconsistent 
commands of the different state legislatures" and to allocate and distribute 
the Colorado River's water.152 
Despite a vociferous dissent, Arizona significantly strengthened federal 
authority over water allocation and distribution, and decisively tipped the 
balance between state and federal authority in section 8 of the Reclamation 
Act towards dominant federal control. 
d.  1964 Arizona Decree
A 1964 Supreme Court decree153 following the Arizona v. California 
decision, defined key terms from the 1963 decision and the growing lexicon 
of the Law of the River.  "Perfected right"154 and "present perfected rights"155 
were to be protected as senior priorities on an interstate level in times of 
149. Id. at 581.
150. Id. at 564.
151. Id. at 589.
152. Id. at 589-90.
153. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964).
154. (G) 'Perfected right' means a water right acquired in accordance
with state law, which right has been exercised by the actual
diversion of a specific quantity of water that has been applied to a
defined area of land or to definite municipal or industrial works,
and in addition shall include water rights created by the
reservation of mainstream water for the use of federal
establishments under federal law whether or not the water has
been applied to beneficial use.
Id. at 341. 
155. "(H) 'Present perfected rights' means perfected rights, as here defined,
existing as of June 25, 1929, the effective date of the Boulder Canyon Project Act."  Id. 
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insufficient water to satisfy the full Lower Basin legal apportionment of 7.5 
MAF.156  The Decree required the "satisfaction of present perfected rights in 
the order of their priority date without regard to state lines,"157 utilizing a 
traditional prior appropriation shortage formula similar to the Supreme 
Court decision in Wyoming. 
The Decree also directed the Lower Basin states to quantify and 
identify "present perfected rights" which had been established before the 
passage of the BCPA. 158  All water rights perfected would be placed in one of 
two baskets, either before or after 1929, and the Secretary would first satisfy 
those rights established prior to 1929.159  It also reinforced the Secretary's 
water delivery contracting authority as the only valid method for any Lower 
Basin contractor to receive water from the Colorado River.160 
156. (3) If insufficient mainstream water is available for release, as
determined by the Secretary of the Interior, to satisfy annual
consumptive use of 7,500,000 acre-feet in the aforesaid three
States, then the Secretary of the Interior, after providing for
satisfaction of present perfected rights in the order of their priority
dates without regard to state lines and after consultation with the
parties to major delivery contracts and such representatives as
the respective States may designate, may apportion the amount
remaining available for consumptive use in such manner as is
consistent with the Boulder Canyon Project Act as interpreted by
the opinion of this Court herein, and with other applicable
federal statutes, but in no event shall more than 4,400,000 acre-
feet be apportioned for use in California including all present
perfected rights.
Id. at 341-42. 
157. Id. at 342.
158. Id. at 351.
159. Id. at 341-43.
160. (5) Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraphs (1) through (4)
of this subdivision (B), mainstream water shall be released or
delivered to water users (including but not limited to public and
municipal corporations and other public agencies) in Arizona,
California, and Nevada only pursuant to valid contracts therefor
made with such users by the Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to
Section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act or any other
applicable federal statute.
Id. at 343. 
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e.  California v. United States
In 1978, for the first time since Arizona, the State of California and 
BuRec again clashed over their respective roles and authority under the 
Reclamation Act.  In California v. United States,161 the issue was whether the 
SWRCB could lawfully attach conditions to its approval of appropriation 
permit applications from BuRec regarding acquisition of water rights needed 
to store water of the Stanislaus River behind the federally owned New 
Melones Dam.162 
The SWRCB had conditioned the acquisition of the water right by 
BuRec upon compliance with a California law that required the appropriated 
waters to be used both "reasonably" and "beneficially."163  The SWRCB did 
not deny the federal application to appropriate water, but it would not grant 
a permit in advance of the submittal of a "specific plan" for the use of the 
water so that the SWRCB could ensure compliance with state reasonable, 
beneficial use law.  BuRec had no advance contracts in place for water 
delivery or use, and thus could not comply with the SWRCB condition that a 
specific plan be submitted. 
BuRec challenged the SWRCB's authority to impose any conditions,164 
since it considered the water rights appropriation application and permit 
issuance process a mere formality.  BuRec argued that Ivanhoe, Fresno, and 
Arizona had diminished state authority over appropriation and distribution of 
water for federal projects and therefore there was no role left for the SWRCB 
for federal projects with respect to defining and enforcing state reasonable, 
beneficial use requirements. 
Justice Rehnquist began the analysis at the 1902 Reclamation Act and 
traced a "consistent thread of purposeful and continued deference to state 
water law by Congress."165  Congress intended that "authority over intrastate 
waterways lies with the States."166  As originally conceived, the blueprint for 
cooperative federalism between state and federal roles was most clearly 
delineated through Secretarial control and management of the "construction 
161. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
162. Id. at 647, 652; Kelley, Staging a Comeback, supra note 72; Walston, supra
note 72. 
163. California, 438 U.S. at 652-654.
164. United States v. California, 694 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
California, 509 F. Supp 867 (E.D. Cal. 1981); California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 
(1978); United States v. California, 558 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. California, 
403 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Cal. 1975); see also Kelley, Staging a Comeback, supra note 72. 
165. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978).
166. Id. at 662.
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and operation167 of reclamation projects, while state law would govern the 
realm of "appropriation and later distribution" of water.168  State law 
controlled the distribution of water once it was released from a federal 
dam,169 since a "principal motivating factor"170 for federal deference to state 
law was the legal confusion that would inhere if both sets of laws operated 
"side by side."171 
Nonetheless, federal deference was not a blank check for states to do 
as they wished with reclamation water.  Express provisions, such as the 
section 8 reasonable, beneficial use requirement, the preference for 
irrigation use, and the 160-acre irrigation maximum limited intrastate use of 
reclamation water.172  The court noted the overriding message of the 
Reclamation Act was silence and omission, reflecting a fundamental intent 
to restrict federal authority from inception. 
After recounting this early history, the more recent incongruity of 
Ivanhoe, Fresno, and Arizona posed a formidable task for judicial reconciliation. 
Weighing the legislative language and subsequent history, it became 
apparent that a clear expression of section 8 intent to uphold state 
sovereignty with regard to appropriation and distribution had been radically 
turned on its head, eroding a cornerstone of state authority.  California 
asked the court to reassert the primacy of the states' authority,173 while 
BuRec argued that recent Supreme Court language had stripped states of 
that authority. 
The issues in Ivanhoe and Fresno were characterized as particular 
conflicts between express federal directives and contrary provisions of 
California law (160-acre limit and reclamation preference for irrigation over 
municipal uses of water).174  Thus, the distinction between acquisition and 
167. Id. at 664.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 665-67.
170. Id. at 668.
171. Id. at 668-69.
172. Id. at 668 n.21.
173. "Petitioners instead ask us to hold that a State may impose any condition
on the ‘control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water’ through a federal 
reclamation project that is not inconsistent with clear congressional directives 
respecting the project."  Id. at 672. 
174. While we are not convinced that the above language is
diametrically inconsistent with the position of petitioners, or that
it squarely supports the United States, it undoubtedly goes further
than was necessary to decide the cases presented to the Court.
Ivanhoe and City of Fresno involved conflicts between § 8, requiring
the Secretary to follow state law as to water rights, and other
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distribution within Ivanhoe was recognized as dictum and discarded.  This 
removed a critical linchpin from the subsequent dicta in Fresno which had 
limited state authority over appropriation. 
Similarly, the Court narrowly construed the holding in Arizona to an 
issue of whether state law could control the distribution of water in a multi-
state reclamation project.175  Congress had specifically empowered the 
Secretary to enter permanent delivery contracts, free from state limitations 
or conditions, to ensure that the distribution of Colorado River water among 
the Lower Basin states and within each state was consistent with 
congressional allocation.  The Arizona Court borrowed the dictum from 
Ivanhoe and Fresno as to the scope of section 8, but there was "no need for it 
to reaffirm such language except as it related to the singular legislative 
history of the Boulder Canyon Project Act."176 
Rehnquist specifically distinguished the express Congressional 
authorization to consolidate interstate contracting authority in the Secretary 
for the Colorado River from a Congressional grant of unlimited power to the 
Secretary to dictate contract terms relating to distribution of all waters 
without accommodation for state conditions.177  The apportioned distribution 
of the main stem waters of the Colorado River between interstate 
appropriators was Congress's express intent under the BCPA.  The opinion 
in California discarded the distinction between acquisition and distribution 
and undercut the decision in Arizona that state law had no role when the 
BCPA and Reclamation Act were reconciled alongside one another.  On the 
contrary, the Reclamation Act preempted the BCPA. 
Rehnquist identified the essence of the previous holdings: "state water 
law does not control in the distribution of reclamation water if inconsistent 
with other congressional directives to the Secretary."178  The section 8 
savings clause in the Reclamation Act would not be brushed aside lightly, 
nor would the Court need to reverse its prior holdings.  However, state 
authority still needed to be reconciled with the Secretary's express BCPA 
section 5 contract authority.  The core issue boiled down to the context and 
syntax of acquisition and distribution of water within the Colorado River 
system and the broader reclamation program.  The immediate context at 
provisions of Reclamation Acts that placed specific limitations on 
how the water was to be distributed.  Here the United States 
contends that it may ignore state law even if no explicit 
congressional directive conflicts with the conditions imposed by 
the California State Water Control Board. 
Id. at 673. 
175. Id. at 674.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 673-75.
178. Id. at 668 n.21.
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issue in the Arizona opinion was distribution by the Secretary to interstate 
recipients, while the acquisition of the water was expressly solved by 
Congress's apportionment between sibling states. 
The California opinion reconciled the two extremes of interpretation 
and recognized a section 5 federal power to veto state distributions of 
reclamation water, but it did not find language that permitted the Secretary 
to limit distribution of water beyond the BCPA section 4(a) language 
authorizing permanent water allocations.  The ultimate purpose of the BCPA 
is to allocate and distribute the waters of the Colorado River and force the 
State of California into a permanent quantified limit for the benefit of 
California's uneasy neighbors.  It was not to usurp state authority. 
The Supreme Court concluded that section 8 authorized states to 
govern the substance of water supply distribution.179  Returning to the 
beneficial use standard within section 8 and the absence of any 
Congressional language within the BCPA limiting section 8, there was a 
strong implication that Congress was not concerned about the "possibly 
inconsistent" state commands once water was delivered within a state and 
exclusively applied intrastate.  The integrity of state authority under section 
8's reasonable, beneficial use clause, the Congressional purpose of the 
BCPA, and the Secretary's section 5 contract authority could stand alongside 
each other and govern separate aspects of water allocation and distribution 
on the Lower Colorado. 
The California opinion resurrected state authority in the domain of 
"control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water"180 on federal 
179. Id. at 678.
180. But because there is at least tension between the above-quoted
dictum and what we conceive to be the correct reading of § 8 of
the Reclamation Act of 1902, we disavow the dictum to the extent that
it would prevent petitioners from imposing conditions on the
permit granted to the United States which are not inconsistent
with congressional provisions authorizing the project in question.
Section 8 cannot be read to require the Secretary to comply with
state law only when it becomes necessary to purchase or
condemn vested water rights.  That section does, of course,
provide for the protection of vested water rights, but it also requires
the Secretary to comply with state law in the “control, appropriation, use, or
distribution of water.”  Nor, as the United States contends, does § 8
merely require the Secretary of the Interior to file a notice with the
State of his intent to appropriate but to thereafter ignore the
substantive provisions of state law. The legislative history of the
Reclamation Act of 1902 makes it abundantly clear that Congress
intended to defer to the substance, as well as the form, of state
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reclamation projects.  The creeping judicial distinctions and dicta from three 
successive cases, which had reversed a tradition of cooperative federalism, 
were effectively trimmed to restore the original balance between state and 
federal authorities. 
f. 1979 Arizona Decree
Per the 1964 Decree, the three Lower Basin States were brought back 
before the Supreme Court to outline and establish a quantified table of 
present perfected rights.181  In accord with the Reclamation Act, the 1979 
Decree reiterated that "[a]ny water right listed herein may be exercised only 
for beneficial uses."182  It also quantified IID's present perfected rights with a 
maximum and a formula,183 but it did not elaborate on how or whether 
federal or state law would define beneficial use, what processes should be 
utilized, or address any maximum reasonable beneficial use "duty" on IID. 
g.  Bryant v. Yellen
In 1980, the Supreme Court, in Bryant v. Yellen, addressed the issue of 
whether irrigated private lands that exceeded 160 acres before the passage 
of the Reclamation Act were exempt from the 160-acre reclamation 
limitation on irrigation deliveries. 184  Importantly, the Supreme Court rooted 
present perfected rights within state water law185 and identified a clear role 
water law.  The Government's interpretation would trivialize the 
broad language and purpose of § 8. 
Id. at 674-75 (emphasis added). 
181. Arizona, 439 U.S. 419 (1979).
182. Id. at 421.
183. The Imperial Irrigation District in annual quantities not to exceed
(i) 2,600,000 acre-feet of diversions from the mainstream or (ii) the
quantity of mainstream water necessary to supply the
consumptive use required for irrigation of 424,145 acres and for
the satisfaction of related uses, whichever of (i) or (ii) is less, with
a priority date of 1901.
Id. at 429. 
184. 447 U.S. 352 (1980).
185. In the first place, it bears emphasizing that the § 6 perfected
right is a water right originating under state law.  In Arizona v.
California, we held that the Project Act vested in the Secretary the
power to contract for project water deliveries independent of the
direction of § 8 of the Reclamation Act to proceed in accordance
with state law and of the admonition of § 18 of the Project Act not
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for state law in "determining the content and characteristics of the water 
right that was adjudicated to the District by our decree."186  The Court carved 
out a protected haven for present perfected rights from federal controls and 
restraints associated with the BCPA.187 
4. Conclusion: Limits on Federal Beneficial Use Authority
Decided only six months after Fresno, the Arizona v. California opinion is 
an unquestioned landmark in the Law of the River and remains the lead 
authority for interpretation of the BCPA.188  However, the impact of California 
on Arizona is the most critical cog in the analysis of whether the Secretary, by 
regulation after entering permanent service contracts, can preempt state 
reasonable, beneficial use laws and procedures. 
The Supreme Court addressed the section 5 contractual authority of 
the Secretary related to interstate allocations of the Colorado River in Arizona 
and the federal-state balance of section 8 authority in California.  As 
discussed above, California explicitly disavowed dicta from two prominent 
section 8 cases, Ivanhoe and Fresno, diminishing reliance on Arizona as 
authority to justify federal displacement of state law. 
California unambiguously validated a state role in both acquisition and 
distribution, specifically related to reasonable beneficial use, and strikes 
inconsistent aspects of the Arizona holding.  California affirmed SWRCB 
authority to impose and condition a beneficial use requirement on the 
to interfere with state law. . . . We nevertheless clearly recognized 
that § 6 of the Project Act, requiring satisfaction of present 
perfected rights, was an unavoidable limitation on the Secretary's 
power and that in providing for these rights the Secretary must 
take account of state law.  In this respect, state law was not 
displaced by the Project Act and must be consulted in 
determining the content and characteristics of the water right that 
was adjudicated to the District by our decree. 
Id. at 370-71. 
186. Id. at 371.
187. Here, we are dealing with perfected rights protected by the Project
Act; and because its water rights are to be interpreted in the light of
state law, the District should now be as free of land limitations with
respect to the land it was irrigating in 1929 as it was prior to the
passage of the Project Act.  To apply § 46 would go far toward
emasculating the substance, under state law, of the water right
decreed to the District, as well as substantially limiting its duties to,
and the rights of, the farmer-beneficiaries in the District.
Id. at 373-74. 
188. Arizona, 373 U.S. 546, 551 (1963).
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acquisition of water by BuRec.  Arizona and section 5, therefore, cannot be 
the basis for Secretarial authority to impose reasonable, beneficial use 
restrictions or deny the role of state law and a state authority over 
reasonable, beneficial use disputes.  Arizona is not authority to supplant 
applicable California reasonable, beneficial use law and procedures. 
At the same time, while section 8 expressly articulates a federal 
requirement of reasonable, beneficial use for water distribution governing 
all reclamation projects, the language falls far short of the necessary depth 
or breadth to establish a federal standard which can be distinguished from 
applicable state law.  At every possible juncture, the meat of express 
legislative language is left off the bone.  If state law evidenced the outright 
absence of a state beneficial use standard and adjudication process, one 
might infer greater leeway for a federal role to implement the express 
requirement of section 8.  However, California has substantial constitu-
tional, statutory, judicial, and administrative authorities that explicitly 
govern reasonable, beneficial use.  There is no vacuum for federal authority 
to fill and the Supreme Court has identified no preemptive basis to do so. 
C. California Beneficial Use Laws
Conflict preemption analysis also requires an analysis of California law 
and process to determine whether a direct conflict exists with federal law or 
whether California law or process thwarts the Congressional intent of the 
previously discussed federal law.  As outlined on remand of California, "[a] 
state statute or regulation is preempted by a federal rule 'to the extent it 
conflicts with a federal statute' or where it stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress."189  If conflict is not found, California's beneficial use law will be 
presumed to stand. 
1. Constitutional and Statutory Authority
In 1928, just before the BCPA was passed, article X, section 2 of the 
California Constitution was enacted by the California legislature.190  
Common law reasonable, beneficial use definitions were expressly 
consolidated through one overarching governing standard. 
It is hereby declared that because of the conditions 
prevailing in this State the general welfare requires that the 
water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the 
fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste 
189. United States v. California, 694 F.2d 1171, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 1982).
190. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
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or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water be 
prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is to be 
exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use 
thereof in the interest of the people and for the public 
welfare.  The right to water or to the use or flow of water in 
or from any natural stream or water course in this State is 
and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required 
for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and 
shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable 
method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water.191 
Since 1928, California's legislature has articulated nuanced statutory 
details of how reasonable, beneficial use, waste, and unreasonable use are 
to be measured and determined.192  For example, statutes identify the limit 
of an appropriated water right, when it ceases, and the process whereby a 
right reverts to the public.193  "Conserved water" is a recognized reasonable, 
191. Id. (emphasis added).
192. California's Water Code was created by the state legislature in 1943, but
has statutory roots dating back to the Civil Code of 1872. 
193. Purpose of appropriation; cessation of right: The appropriation
must be for some useful or beneficial purpose, and when the
appropriator or his successor in interest ceases to use it for such a
purpose the right ceases.
CAL. WATER CODE § 1240 (West 2008); 
Reversion of unused water: When the person entitled to the use of 
water fails to use beneficially all or any part of the water claimed 
by him, for which a right of use has vested, for the purpose for 
which it was appropriated or adjudicated, for a period of five 
years, such unused water may revert to the public and shall, if 
reverted, be regarded as unappropriated public water.  Such 
reversion shall occur upon a finding by the board following notice to 
the permittee and a public hearing if requested by the permittee. 
CAL. WATER CODE § 1241 (West 2008); 
Beneficial use of water: It is hereby declared that because of the 
conditions prevailing in this State the general welfare requires 
that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the 
fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or 
unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, 
and that the conservation of such water is to be exercised with a 
view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the 
people and for the public welfare.  The right to water or to the use 
or flow of water in or from any natural stream or watercourse in 
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beneficial use, preventing conserved water from being classified as waste 
and subject to possible forfeiture, which provides an important incentive for 
cooperation by water rights holders.194  In addition, California expressly 
recognizes the use of water for recreation, fish, and wildlife values as 
beneficial uses.195  The California legislature has articulated specific factors 
this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be 
reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right 
does not and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or 
unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water. 
CAL. WATER CODE § 100 (West 2008) (emphasis added); 
Prevention of unreasonable use of water: The department and 
board shall take all appropriate proceedings or actions before 
executive, legislative, or judicial agencies to prevent waste, 
unreasonable use, unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable 
method of diversion of water in this state.  
CAL. WATER CODE § 275 (West 2008). 
194. Appropriated water rights; cessation or reduction in use;
forfeiture; transfer; reversion of rights: (a) When any person
entitled to the use of water under an appropriative right fails to
use all or any part of the water because of water conservation
efforts, any cessation or reduction in the use of the appropriated
water shall be deemed equivalent to a reasonable beneficial use
of water to the extent of the cessation or reduction in use.  No
forfeiture of the appropriative right to the water conserved shall
occur upon the lapse of the forfeiture period applicable to water
appropriated pursuant to the Water Commission Act or this code
or the forfeiture period applicable to water appropriated prior to
December 19, 1914.
CAL. WATER CODE § 1011 (West 2008). 
195. Recreation; preservation of fish and wildlife resources: The use
of water for recreation and preservation and enhancement of fish
and wildlife resources is a beneficial use of water.  In determining
the amount of water available for appropriation for other
beneficial uses, the board shall take into account, whenever it is in
the public interest, the amounts of water required for
recreation and the preservation and enhancement of fish and
wildlife resources.  The board shall notify the Department of
Fish and Game of any application for a permit to appropriate
water.  The Department of Fish and Game shall recommend the
amounts of water, if any, required for the preservation and
enhancement of fish and wildlife resources and shall report its
findings to the board.  This section shall not be construed to
affect riparian rights.
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governing what beneficial uses must be considered and how these beneficial 
uses are to be synthesized into a final determination by the SWRCB.196 
2. Judicial Authority
The breadth and depth of California judicial opinions add significant 
substance to the California law of reasonable, beneficial use.  Herminghaus v. 
Southern California Edison Co.197 held that use of water by a downstream 
riparian to flood pastureland was a protected beneficial use of state water 
with priority over a proposed upstream appropriation for a power project. 
Even though the flood waters benefited few people relative to the net 
benefit provided by the proposed power project, the court did not strike at 
the reasonableness of the beneficial riparian use of water.  The case 
precipitated the adoption of the Constitutional amendment embodied in 
article X, section2.  Priority of right no longer precluded an evaluation of 
the reasonableness or the degree of beneficial use among competing water 
right holders. 
In 1935, the Peabody v. Vallejo198 decision evaluated the question of 
unreasonableness, waste, and beneficial use of water by a riparian who used 
the entire flow of a river to flood his lands with restorative silts.  After 
contemplating a set of facts roughly similar to Herminghaus, the court 
dissected the asserted right by the riparian to the "full flood flow" of the 
stream with the new article X, section 2 standard of reasonableness.199  The 
CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West 2008). 
196. Consideration of relative benefit:  In acting upon applications to
appropriate water, the board shall consider the relative benefit to
be derived from (1) all beneficial uses of the water concerned
including, but not limited to, use for domestic, irrigation,
municipal, industrial, preservation and enhancement of fish and
wildlife, recreational, mining and power purposes, and any uses
specified to be protected in any relevant water quality control
plan, and (2) the reuse or reclamation of the water sought to be
appropriated, as proposed by the applicant.  The board may
subject such appropriations to such terms and conditions as in its
judgment will best develop, conserve, and utilize in the public
interest, the water sought to be appropriated.
CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 2008). 
197. Herminghaus v. S. Cal. Edison, 252 P. 607, 619-20 (Cal. 1926).
198. Peabody v. Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1935).
199. "A stream supply may be divided but the product of the division in
nowise remains the same.  When the supply is limited; public interest requires that 
there be the greatest number of beneficial uses which the supply can yield."  Id. at 
491; 
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Court decided the law no longer supported continued and unreasonable 
use.200  As a result, no water right within the state was exempt from the 
. . .  
1. The right to the use of water is limited to such water as shall be
reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served. 2. Such right
does not extend to the waste of water.  3. Such right does not
extend to unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable
method of diversion of water.  4. Riparian rights attach to, but to no
more than so much of the flow as may be required or used
consistently with this section of the Constitution.
Id. (emphasis added); 
. . .  
As to what is waste water depends on the circumstances of each 
case and the time when waste is required to be prevented.  In 
sections of the state, few in number, where the rivers and streams 
are plentifully supplied, and there is no need for the conservation of 
the product thereof, the water flows freely to the sea.  When 
needed for beneficial uses it may be stored or restrained by 
appropriation subject to the rights of those who have a lawful 
priority in a reasonable beneficial use. That priority has been subjected 
to limitations and regulations prescribed by the Constitution, but 
it has by no means been abolished.  Under the new policy the 
vested right theory, that is, the right of the riparian owner to all of 
the waters of the stream, as it is wont to flow in the state of 
nature, and without regard to the reasonableness of such use as 
against an appropriator, has been subjected to such limitations 
that the old doctrine . . . is no longer the law of this state. 
Id. at 492 (emphasis added). 
. . .  
[T]he rule of reasonable use as enjoined by section 3 of article XIV
[now Article X, Section 2] of the Constitution applies to all water
rights enjoyed or asserted in this state, whether the same be
grounded on the riparian right or the right, analogous to the
riparian right, of the overlying land owner, or the percolating water
right, or the appropriative right.
Id. at 498-99 (emphasis added). 
200. The asserted right of a riparian owner, whose lands in a state of
nature form a delta at about sea level, to have the full flood flow
of the stream to overflow his lands for the purpose of depositing
silt thereon, or by artificial check dams and levees to remove the
saline content of the soil which in a state of nature are salt marsh
lands, cannot be supported.  So far as we are advised, this asserted
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sweeping purpose of article X, section2, and all water users were put on notice 
that the state would no longer consider past use as a presumptive safe harbor 
with absolute immunity from reasonable beneficial use evaluation.201 
Additional case law refined and illustrated the limits of beneficial use. 
At issue in Tulare Irrigation District v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District202 was 
the reasonableness of the use of water to flush out and drown gophers that 
damaged overlying crops.  The court discussed the growing needs of an 
expanding population in terms of a dynamic, non-static variable in the 
beneficial use analysis, and described how beneficial uses of one era could 
gradually displace and outweigh established uses from another.203  The court 
distinguished a quantity of water considered to be an "excessive diversion" 
above the amount required for "reasonably necessary" use204 and specified 
right does not inhere in the riparian right at common law, and as a 
natural right cannot be asserted as against the police power of the 
state in the conservation of its waters.  This asserted right involves 
an unreasonable use or an unreasonable method of use or an unreasonable 
method of diversion of water as contemplated by the Constitution.   
Id. at 492 (emphasis added). 
201. [T]he rule of reasonable use as enjoined by section 3 of article
XIV [now Article X, Section 2] of the Constitution applies to all
water rights enjoyed or asserted in this state, whether the same be
grounded on the riparian right or the right, analogous to the
riparian right, of the overlying land owner, or the percolating water
right, or the appropriative right.
Id. at 498-99. 
202. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972 (Cal.
1935). 
203. As the pressure of population has led to the attempt to bring
under cultivation more and more lands, and as the demands for
water to irrigate these lands have become more and more
pressing, the decisions have become increasingly emphatic in
limiting the appropriator to the quantity reasonably necessary for
beneficial uses.
Id. at 997 (italics added). 
204. If the appropriator uses more than the amount so required, he
gains no right thereto.  An excessive diversion of water for any
purpose cannot be regarded as a diversion for a beneficial use.
In so far as the diversion exceeds the amount reasonably necessary
for beneficial purposes, it is contrary to the policy of the law and
is a taking without right and confers no title, no matter for how
long continued.
Id. (emphasis added). 
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that the measuring standard was not "the most scientific method known," 
but instead would generally be established by local custom.205 
Tulare did not eliminate senior priority rights based on waste and 
instead injected an element of beneficial use flexibility to protect farmers 
and irrigators who could not afford to keep pace with the "most scientific 
method" of diversion or maintain the most modern distribution systems. 206  
The Court clearly recognized the importance of increased economic utility 
and the need to avoid waste as core beneficial use considerations. 
However, neither consideration could be applied absolutely to a beneficial 
use determination to unilaterally preempt and usurp local customs and 
water control.207 
In 1967, Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water Dist.208 broadened the scope of 
reasonable, beneficial use review to include "statewide considerations of 
transcendent importance."209  A riparian plaintiff sought to enjoin the 
construction of a dam, since the diminished flows below the dam prevented 
205. "However, an appropriator cannot be compelled to divert according to the
most scientific method known.  He is entitled to make a reasonable use of the water 
according to the general custom of the locality, so long as the custom does not 
involve unnecessary waste."  Id. (emphasis added). 
206. Id.
207. There can be no doubt that respondents as a group do not
divert the water in the most scientific manner.  There can be no
doubt that in some cases, because of the paralleling of the ditches
of some of the respondents, there is an uneconomic use of water.
If all of the respondents constituted one appropriating unit, then
perhaps there would be some merit in appellant's contention that
respondents' methods are wasteful.  But these various
appropriators are not one unit—each one has its own
appropriative right, gained by many years of use.  The courts
cannot and, even if they had the power, should not compel these
appropriators, many of whom have been diverting water for over
fifty years, at their expense, to build new systems of diversion.
Id. at 1009 (emphasis added). 
208. Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1967).
209. Although, as we have said, what is a reasonable use of water
depends on the circumstances of each case, such an inquiry
cannot be resolved in vacuo isolated from statewide considerations of
transcendent importance.  Paramount among these we see the ever
increasing need for the conservation of water in this state, an
inescapable reality of life quite apart from its express recognition
in the 1928 amendment.
Id. at 894 (emphasis added). 
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the beneficial recharge of gravels and other sediments on the riparian's 
property.  The court evaluated the growing list of beneficial use factors to 
ascertain whether such use of water was beneficial and concluded that the 
use of unfettered flows to restore gravel beds could not be treated as a 
reasonable, beneficial use.210 
Similarly, in SWRCB v. Forni,211 the court considered whether or not the 
beneficial diversion and use of water from the Napa River for the purpose of 
frost protection was unreasonable.  Encountering a need to differentiate 
distinctions between beneficial uses that could also be deemed 
unreasonable, as in Joslin, the Court announced "the overriding 
constitutional consideration is to put the water resources of the state to a 
reasonable use and make them available for the constantly increasing needs 
of all the people."  The court explained that "[I]n order to attain this 
objective, the riparian owners may properly be required to endure some 
inconvenience or to incur reasonable expenses."212  A showing of beneficial 
use can only be supported if the underlying usage is reasonable.  If a use is 
beneficial, yet unreasonable, the use cannot stand.213 
One year later, in Environmental Defense Fund v. EBMUD (I),214 a public 
interest plaintiff sought to enjoin the construction of a canal which would 
change the point of diversion in the Lower American River and thereby harm 
a fall run of Chinook salmon.  Although the case was later overruled and 
remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court, the state court emphasized the 
210. On the other hand, unlike the unanimous policy
pronouncements relative to the use and conservation of natural
waters, we are aware of none relative to the supply and availability
of sand, gravel and rock in commercial quantities.  Plaintiffs do
not urge that the general welfare or public interest requires that
particular or exceptional measures be employed to insure that
such natural resources be made generally available and should
therefore be carefully conserved.
Id. at 894-95 (emphasis added). 
211. State Water Res. Control Bd. v. Forni, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851, 855-56 (Ct. App. 1976). 
212. Id. at 856.
213. [T]he claim that respondents' use of water is beneficial does not
bring it within the constitutional postulate of reasonableness.  As
emphasized in Joslin, “beneficial use” cannot be equated with
“reasonable use,” and “the mere fact that a use may be beneficial to
a riparian's lands is not sufficient if the use is not also reasonable
within the meaning of section 3 of article XIV [now Article X,
Section 2] . . . .”  (Joslin, 429 P.2d 889).
Id. at 751 (emphasis added). 
214. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 572 P.2d 1128 (Cal. 1977).
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necessity to evaluate the entire circumstances, more so when 
"transcendent interests of public health and safety beyond normal water 
use are involved."215 
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court216 added the "public trust 
doctrine" to California reasonable, beneficial use considerations.217  The case 
centered on the reasonableness of water diversions from non-navigable 
tributary streams feeding Mono Lake.  The court commented that article X, 
section 2 establishes that "[a]ll uses of water, including public trust uses, 
must now conform to the standard of reasonable use."218  The court noted 
the obvious dependence of the population and economy "upon the 
appropriation of vast quantities of water for uses unrelated to in-stream 
trust values."219  The court also recognized a new component of reasonable, 
beneficial use insofar as "it prevents any party from acquiring a vested right 
to appropriate water in a manner harmful to interests protected by the 
public trust."220 
The judiciary acted as the state guardian to protect fish, wildlife, and 
recreational values from the sometimes mechanical application of economic 
analysis and beneficial utility.221  The public trust doctrine precludes 
reasonable beneficial use determinations from omitting consideration of 
public trust values.  Yet the court pragmatically acknowledged the difficulty 
in weighing and balancing these considerations: 
215. Id. at 1137.
216. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
217. Three excellent resources to introduce Public Trust Doctrine are: Joseph
L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68
MICH. L. REV. 473 (1970); Harrison C. Dunning, The Significance of California's Public
Trust Easement for California's Water Rights Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357 (1980); and
Gregory S. Weber, Articulating the Public Trust: Text, Near-Text, and Context, 27 ARIZ. ST.
L.J 1155 (1996).
218. 658 P.2d at 725.
219. Id. at 727.
220. Id.
221. The state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into
account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to
protect public trust uses whenever feasible.  Just as the history of
this state shows that appropriation may be necessary for efficient
use of water despite unavoidable harm to public trust values, it
demonstrates that an appropriative water rights system
administered without consideration of the public trust may cause
unnecessary and unjustified harm to trust interests.
Id. at 728. 
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As a matter of practical necessity the state may have to 
approve appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public 
trust uses.  In so doing, however, the state must bear in 
mind its duty as trustee to consider the effect of the taking 
on the public trust [citation omitted] and to preserve, so far 
as consistent with the public interest, the uses protected by 
the trust.222 
United States v. SWRCB recognized water-quality impacts as relevant to 
reasonable, beneficial use determinations.223  The case arose in the context 
of state efforts to regulate water quality in the Bay Delta.  The court 
referenced reasonable, beneficial use as the "cardinal principle"224 of 
California water law and recognized SWRCB regulatory authority to prevent 
uses that unreasonably harm water quality.  SWRCB authority included the 
evaluation of the "relative benefit" to be derived from competing uses of 
water, even those which are beneficial and reasonable, but which become 
less so when water quality impacts are considered.225  The SWRCB decision 
reaffirms the broad authority226 to modify permits on the basis that 
previously reasonable, beneficial uses of water had become unreasonable.227 
222. Id.
223. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App. 1986).
224. Id. at 171.
225. Moreover, the power of the Board to set permit terms and
conditions (§ 1253) includes the power to consider the “relative
benefit” to be derived (§ 1257).  If the Board is authorized to weigh
the values of competing beneficial uses, then logically it should
also be authorized to alter the historic rule of “first in time, first in
right” by imposing permit conditions which give a higher priority
to a more preferred beneficial use even though later in time.
Id. at 189. 
226. We perceive no legal obstacle to the Board's determination that
particular methods of use have become unreasonable by their
deleterious effects upon water quality.  Obviously, some
accommodation must be reached concerning the major public
interests at stake: the quality of valuable water resources and
transport of adequate supplies for needs southward.  The decision
is essentially a policy judgment requiring a balancing of the
competing public interests, one the Board is uniquely qualified to
make in view of its special knowledge and expertise and its
combined statewide responsibility to allocate the rights to, and to
control the quality of, state water resources.  (§ 174.) (26) (See
fn. 24.), (27) We conclude, finally, that the Board's power to
prevent unreasonable methods of use should be broadly interpreted to
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Imperial Irrigation District v. SWRCB (I)228 added water conservation 
opportunities to the lexicon of reasonable, beneficial use considerations. 
The SWRCB determined that IID's failure to develop a plan for additional 
water conservation measures could constitute a misuse of water.229  The 
SWRCB ordered IID to explore conservation opportunities and efficiency 
improvements to be financed by urban junior priority holders in search of 
new water.230  By 1988, the SWRCB (with judicial support) asserted that it 
could impose a "physical solution" on IID and junior right holders if they 
could not reach agreement on a conserved water transfer.  Important to 
the future Part 417 dispute, the SWRCB expressly recognized increased 
water use efficiency as an important element of the reasonable, beneficial 
use analysis.231 
A more recent articulation of California's reasonable, beneficial use 
doctrine occurred in City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency.232  The plaintiff city 
sought a guarantee of adequate groundwater within a basin that suffered 
from an annual overdraft of water supply.  The trial court determined that an 
"equitable apportionment" between parties could be imposed as a physical 
solution to the water supply issue to the detriment of senior water right 
holders with priority.  The California Supreme Court reversed the decision 
and firmly protected senior water right holders.  In so doing, the Court 
bucked the beneficial use trend which disfavored agriculture by tilting water 
resources towards larger population centers.  Any proclivity the state may 
enable the Board to strike the proper balance between the interests 
in water quality and project activities in order to objectively 
determine whether a reasonable method of use is manifested. 
Id. at 188 (emphasis added). 
227. Here, the Board determined that changed circumstances
revealed in new information about the adverse effects of the
projects upon the Delta necessitated revised water quality
standards.  Accordingly, the Board had the authority to modify the
projects' permits to curtail their use of water on the ground that the
projects' use and diversion of the water had become unreasonable. 
Id. at 187 (emphasis added). 
228. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 231 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Ct.
App. 1986). 
229. Imperial Irrigation Dist., Decision 1600, at 66 (Cal. State Water Res.
Control Bd. June 21, 1984). 
230. Id.
231. Imperial Irrigation Dist., Order WR 88-20, at 27-29 (Cal. State Water Res.
Control Bd. Sept. 7, 1988). 
232. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000).
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have revealed for "socializing" water for public uses in the wake of Audubon 
was bluntly rebutted.233 
As dynamic a concept as reasonable, beneficial use must be, the 
California Supreme Court left little doubt that water allocation would not be 
uprooted from its traditional respect for priority.  The Court limited the 
extent to which a lower priority reasonable and beneficial use of water can 
preempt senior water rights.234 
3. SWRCB Beneficial Use Enforcement Authority
a. SWRCB Authority
In California, a corollary question is implicated as to whether SWRCB's 
exercise of its reasonable, beneficial use adjudicative authority conflicts with 
or thwarts federal Colorado River law. 
The SWRCB is the primary administrative agency making reasonable, 
beneficial use determinations over California's developed surface water.  The 
SWRCB is authorized by the California legislature to "provide for the orderly 
and efficient" appropriation of water rights and distribution of water 
resources.235  Section 174 of the California Water Code grants the SWRCB 
concurrent jurisdiction with the courts to "exercise the adjudicatory and 
regulatory functions of the state in the field of water resources."236  As 
prominently noted in the California decision, SWRCB authority is recognized 
233. Thus, although it is clear that a trial court may impose a
physical solution to achieve a practical allocation of water to
competing interests, the solution's general purpose cannot simply
ignore the priority rights of the parties asserting them.  In ordering
a physical solution, therefore, a court may neither change
priorities among the water rights holders nor eliminate vested
rights in applying the solution without first considering them in
relation to the reasonable use doctrine.
  Id. at 869 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
234. Respondents unpersuasively argue for imposition of an
equitable physical solution that disregards prior legal water rights.
They cite the principle that the State Constitution requires the
greatest number of beneficial users that the water supply can
support, but they omit the requirement that this use be subject to
the rights of those with lawful priority to the water.
Id. at 870 (emphasis added). 
235. CAL. WATER CODE § 174 (West 2008).
236. Id.; see also Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 231 Cal. Rptr.
283 (Ct. App. 1986). 
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by the United States Supreme Court,237 while additional authorities, such as 
United States v. SWRCB,238 have expressly239 and unequivocally240 established 
that the SWRCB has significant authority to compel compliance with 
reasonable, beneficial use.241 
237. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 647 (1978).
238. 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App. 1986).
239. All water rights, including appropriative, are subject to the
overriding constitutional limitation that water use must be
reasonable . . . . To that end, the Board is empowered to institute 
necessary judicial, legislative or administrative proceedings to 
prevent waste or unreasonable use . . . including imposition of new permit 
terms . . . . Moreover, all permits of the projects are subject to the 
continuing authority of the Board to prevent unreasonable use. 
Id. at 187 (emphasis added). 
240. We perceive no legal obstacle to the Board's determination that
particular methods of use have become unreasonable by their
deleterious effects upon water quality.  Obviously, some
accommodation must be reached concerning the major public
interests at stake:  the quality of valuable water resources and
transport of adequate supplies for needs southward.  The decision
is essentially a policy judgment requiring a balancing of the
competing public interests, one the Board is uniquely qualified to
make in view of its special knowledge and expertise and its
combined statewide responsibility to allocate the rights to, and to
control the quality of, state water resources. . . . We conclude,
finally, that the Board's power to prevent unreasonable methods of use
should be broadly interpreted to enable the Board to strike the
proper balance between the interests in water quality and project
activities in order to objectively determine whether a reasonable
method of use is manifested.
Id. at 188 (citing CAL. WATER CODE § 174 (West 2008)) (emphasis added). 
241. [T]he Board has the separate and additional power to take
whatever steps are necessary to prevent unreasonable use or methods
of diversion . . . . That independent basis of authority vests 
jurisdiction in the Board to compel compliance with the water 
quality standards insofar as the projects' diversions and exports 
adversely affect water quality. 
Id. at 196-97 (emphasis added). 
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b. IID Cases
The 1984 and 1988 SWRCB assessments of IID's reasonable, beneficial 
use articulated criteria to evaluate IID's alleged waste: (1) other potential 
beneficial uses for conserved water; (2) whether the excess water now serves 
a reasonable and beneficial purpose; (3) probable benefits of water savings; 
(4) amount of water reasonably required for current use; (5) amount and
reasonableness of the cost of saving water; (6) whether the required
methods of saving water are conventional and reasonable rather than
extraordinary; (7) a physical plan or solution.242  Additional factors that the
SWRCB is required to consider are the positive or negative environmental
impacts of the current use versus more efficient water use.243
The 1988 SWRCB order required IID to conserve of 100,000 AFY.  The 
SWRCB acknowledged the enormous financial burden this placed on IID and 
made the 1988 order contingent upon IID finding a third party to pay for the 
cost.244 The third party would become the beneficiary of the conserved water. 
Otherwise, the SWRCB reserved to itself the right to impose a "physical 
solution" requiring IID to conserve and requiring the recipient of the 
conserved water to pay the costs, including environmental mitigation costs. 
c. SWRCB Exclusive Jurisdiction over IID's Water Use
Since the 1980's, the SWRCB has reserved its rights to exercise 
continuous, exclusive jurisdiction over IID. Despite this, in 2003, BuRec 
utilized Part 417 to review whether IID's use was reasonable and beneficial. 
It ignored both the SWRCB's jurisdiction and the State's request for 
consultation on the matter.245 
Assuming the propriety of Part 417 and compliance with section 8 
conformity to state law, the State of California and the United States would 
ordinarily exercise concurrent jurisdiction to determine IID's reasonable, 
beneficial use of Colorado River water under state reasonable, beneficial use 
standards.  However, with the United States' acquiescence in 1986, 
California first exercised and then retained jurisdiction to enforce that 
obligation.  Under these circumstances, the federal government is required 
to defer to California.  The Ninth Circuit has recognized the doctrine of prior 
242. Imperial Irrigation Dist., Decision 1600, at 24-29 (Cal. State Water Res.
Control Bd. June 21, 1984). 
243. Id. at 25.
244. The availability of financial resources for implementing proposed water
conservation measures is a factor to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness 
of an existing method of diversion and use.  Imperial Irrigation Dist., Order WR 88-20, 
at 36 (Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. Sept. 7, 1988). 
245. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 68.
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exclusive jurisdiction as a mandatory bar to federal jurisdiction when the 
federal and state governments previously held concurrent jurisdiction over 
water rights and the state tribunal exercised its jurisdiction first.246 
California's prior exercise of jurisdiction automatically precludes BuRec from 
separately adjudicating the matter. 
246. In State Engineer v. South Fork Band of Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone Indians,
339 F.3d 804, 813 (9th Cir. 2003), a Nevada state court entered a decree determining 
water rights on the Humboldt River.  A dispute arose and a case was filed in state 
court that was removed to federal court.  Id.  The state and federal courts each 
claimed jurisdiction over the matter and enjoined the other from conducting further 
proceedings.  Id. at 807-08.  The issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether a state 
court that has adjudicated a water decree retains exclusive jurisdiction over its 
administration, even though both the federal and state courts could have originally 
exercised jurisdiction.  Id. at 807.  The Ninth Circuit explained that where "both 
federal and state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction," each "may commence 
proceedings to decide questions about the allocation of water rights."  Id. at 813 
(citing Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)). 
However, "jurisdiction is only the power of the court to decide a matter."  Id. (internal 
quotation omitted).  "The mere fact that state and federal courts are initially vested with 
coequal authority does not mean that more than one court can actually adjudicate —
much less administer — decrees over the same res."  Id. (emphasis in original). 
. . .  
The Federal and state courts exercise jurisdiction within the same 
territory, derived from and controlled by separate and distinct 
authority, and are therefore required, upon every principle of 
justice and propriety, to respect the jurisdiction once acquired 
over property by a court of the other sovereignty.  If a court of 
competent jurisdiction, Federal or state, has taken possession of 
property, or by its procedure has obtained jurisdiction over the 
same, such property is withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
other authority as effectually as if the property had been entirely 
removed to the territory of another sovereignty. 
Id. at 809-810 (quoting Palmer v. Texas, 212 U.S. 118, 125 (1909)) (emphasis in original); 
see also Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1922); United States v. Alpine 
Land & Reservoir Co., 174 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he first court to gain 
jurisdiction over a res exercises exclusive jurisdiction over an action involving that 
res.").  The doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction is "no mere discretionary 
abstention rule," but "is a mandatory jurisdictional limitation," denying jurisdiction 
to the federal courts.  S. Fork Band, 339 F.3d at 810. 
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d. SWRCB 2002 Water Transfer and Beneficial
Use Determination
By 2002, IID had voluntarily identified conservation opportunities and 
a willing transferee who had agreed to negotiated payment terms.  The 
SWRCB reviewed this proposed long-term transfer of conserved water, IID's 
full compliance with previous SWRCB reasonable, beneficial use mandates, 
and the impacts of the proposed transfer on other water rights holders, the 
environment, and other third parties.247  The SWRCB pressed for 
environmental mitigation measures to dull the impact of the agricultural 
water conservation and urban transfer on the Salton Sea and expressly 
conditioned approval for the transfer on implementation of certain 
mitigation.248  The SWRCB evaluated the broadest impact of its decision 
and concluded: 
To the extent that environmental impacts are not fully 
mitigated, and to the extent that fallowing may result in 
adverse socio-economic impacts, the public interest in the 
transfer outweighs those adverse impacts.  The transfer is a 
critical part of California's efforts to reduce its use of the 
Colorado River water in accordance with California's 
Colorado River Water Use Plan, the Interim Surplus 
Guidelines, and the draft QSA.  Implementation of the 
247. Provided that IID implements the transfer in accordance with
the QSA and the flooding problem is resolved, we do not
anticipate the need, absent a change in circumstances, to
reassess the reasonableness of IID’s water use before 2024.  IID’s
conservation and transfer of 230,000 to 300,000 afa will be in
furtherance of the SWRCB’s directive to IID, contained in
Decision 1600 and Order WR 88-20, to evaluate secure funding
for, and implement potential conservation measures.  Because
irrigation efficiency is not the only fact relevant to a
determination of reasonableness, it would not be appropriate to
find, as requested by IID, that the circumstances under which we
anticipate it may be necessary to reassess IID’s water use are
limited to IID’s irrigation practices or technological advances in
irrigation efficiency.
Imperial Irrigation Dist., Revised Order WRO 2002-0013, at 81 (State Water 
Res. Control Bd. Oct. 28, 2002). 
248. "In conclusion, we find that, with the implementation of the SSHCS
[Salton Sea Habitat Conservation Strategy] for 15 years, the impacts of the 
conservation and transfer project on the fish, wildlife, and other instream beneficial 
uses of the Salton Sea will not be unreasonable."  Id. at 47. 
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transfer as approved by this order will benefit not just the 
parties to the transfer, but the state as a whole.249 
In its determination, the SWRCB specifically identified and dismissed 
the legal basis for any federal beneficial use preemption as a limit on its 
own beneficial use determination.250 
4. California Summary
California has a rich legal history supporting state sovereignty and 
dominion over the determination of the reasonable, beneficial use of waters. 
The legal precedents for reasonable, beneficial use were established in the 
early days of the Gold Rush and continue to the present. These precedents 
provide structure and predictability for all users of water within California. 
The California judiciary has balanced pragmatic flexibility with respect 
for priority through its reasonable, beneficial use determinations. 
Reasonable, beneficial use is not a static definition under California law, but 
one that evolves gradually.  Over time, California courts, the California 
legislature, and the SWRCB have deemed certain uses previously considered 
beneficial as no longer beneficial, while recognizing new beneficial uses. 
Notably, in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co.251 the U.S. Supreme Court 
specifically referenced article X, section2 of the California Constitution and 
unambiguously confirmed that it "constitutes California's basic water law, to 
which the Federal Reclamation Act defers."252 
As to the 2002 SWRCB review of IID's proposed transfer, California 
exercised its right to control and direct the beneficial and most reasonable 
uses of water within its borders and within the federal limit of 4.4 MAFY. 
Relying on the Court's decision in California, the SWRCB had no reason to 
believe it was without authority.  There was no federal limitation involved, 
such as the 160-acre limitation, or any inconsistency with a federal 
249. Id. at 84.
250. As we stated previously, we question whether federal law can or
should be interpreted to preclude the use of water to mitigate the
impacts of conserving and transferring water for irrigation and
domestic purposes.  But we need not resolve the issue here
because the federal beneficial use requirement cannot be
interpreted to limit IID’s ability to use Colorado River water to
mitigate impacts to the Salton Sea where IID is using its present
perfect rights in a manner consistent with state law.
Imperial Irrigation Dist., Order WRO 2002-0016, at 17 (Cal. State Water Res. 
Control Bd. Dec. 20, 2002). 
251. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
252. Id. at 751.
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preference for agricultural use.  The United States had previously 
participated as a party in evidentiary hearings before the SWRCB, and since 
then the SWRCB had retained continuing jurisdiction over IID's reasonable, 
beneficial use and monitored IID water use compliance.  SWRCB activity in 
2002 was consistent with and an extension of SWRCB's exercised and 
retained jurisdiction. 
In 2002, neither the SWRCB adjudicatory process nor the substance of 
the SWRCB reasonable beneficial use analysis was inconsistent with the 
permanent allocation of the Colorado River created by the BCPA or the 
Secretary's section 5 contract power.  Similarly, California did nothing to 
interfere with the Secretary's operation of the Colorado River infrastructure. 
In sum, California's role regarding IID's reasonable, beneficial use does not 
conflict with any federal purpose. 
D. 43 C.F.R. Part 417 as Implied Federal Beneficial Use Authority
BuRec asserted, in the 2003 Imperial Irrigation District v. U.S. litigation, 
that it had the exclusive beneficial use adjudicatory role pursuant to the 
regulatory authority granted to it by Congress and recognized by the US 
Supreme Court in Arizona v. California.  It argued that the adoption of Part 417 
was the proper exercise of its granted regulatory authority to exclusively 
adjudicate IID reasonable, beneficial use under principles of federal law. 
This section of the article examines and rejects this argument. An 
examination of the Secretary's power to adopt regulations and the purpose 
of such regulations, the wording and substantial adjudicatory procedural 
deficiencies of Part 417, the historical application of Part 417 by BuRec, and 
the inconsistency of Part 417 with the US 1932 contract with IID all reveal no 
appropriate preemptory result. 
1. Sources of Administrative Authority
The Reclamation Act requires the use of water to be beneficial and 
limits water rights to such beneficial use: "The right to the use of water 
acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land 
irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right."253 
BCPA section5 explicitly authorized the Secretary to adopt regulations 
regarding contracts for the storage and delivery of water: 
The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, under 
such general regulations as he may prescribe, to contract 
for the storage of water in said reservoir and for the delivery 
253. 43 U.S.C. § 372 (2008) (emphasis added).
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thereof at such points on the river and on said canal as may 
be agreed upon, for irrigation and domestic uses . . . .254 
The Reclamation Act, as incorporated into the BCPA, also authorizes 
the Secretary to promulgate general rules and regulations:  
The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized to 
perform any and all acts and to make such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary and proper for the 
purpose of carrying the provisions of this Act into full 
force and effect.255 
The Reclamation Reform Act of 1982256 (Reform Act) also authorizes the 
Secretary to issue regulations related to federal reclamation law:  
The Secretary may prescribe regulations and shall collect 
all data necessary to carry out the provisions of this title 
and other provisions of Federal reclamation law.”257 
Thus, the Secretary is expressly authorized to adopt regulations 
regarding the delivery of Colorado River water.  But, Congressional 
authorization for the Secretary to perform administrative adjudications 
regarding a water right holder's reasonable beneficial use of Colorado River 
water is not found in any statute.  The adoption of federal reasonable, 
beneficial use standards and a process to adjudicate compliance is a radical 
departure from historical state, judicial, and contractual provisions and 
cannot be implied from the statutory language granting the Secretary a 
general power to adopt necessary regulations. 
2. Early BuRec Regulations on the Colorado River
The first formal step towards the coupling of state and federal interests 
on the Lower Colorado River is a letter258 from California contractors inviting 
the Secretary to initiate enactment of the BCPA.  Of particular relevance is 
the inclusion of language stating, "[W]e do find that if there are no further 
limitations then upon the construction of the Boulder Dam the supply will 
254. 43 U.S.C. § 617d (2008).
255. 43 U.S.C. § 373 (2008).
256. 43 U.S.C. § 390aa-390zz-1 (2008).
257. 43 U.S.C. § 390ww(c) (2008).
258. Colorado River Commissioners of California, Preliminary Agreement
(February 21, 1930), in RAY LYMAN WILBUR & NORTHCUTT ELY, THE HOOVER DAM
DOCUMENTS app. 1001, at A475 (2d ed., GPO 1948). 
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be ample . . . ."  Based on the savings clause language in both the 
Reclamation Act and the BCPA protecting the domain of state law and the 
subsequent absence of a single express federal limitation, there can be no 
implication that an extension of federal authority was underfoot. 
The second step was the adoption of "General Regulations"259 which 
incorporated key elements of the BCPA.  Contracts for permanent service in 
accord with section 4(a) are reaffirmed, as is the section 5 contracting 
authority.  In addition, "[t]he right is reserved to amend or extend these 
regulations from time to time consistently with said compact and the laws of 
Congress, as the public need may require." 
The third major component in the evolution of regulation is a 1930 
letter from the Secretary260 addressed to IID.  A deferential tone emphasized 
the "impossible" nature of dividing the Colorado until California submits a 
definite figure quantifying the individual water rights within the 4.4 MAF 
allocation.261  The Secretary recognized that "the division of California's share 
of Colorado River water among various California interests is a matter which 
the State, and not the Department of the Interior, should work out and 
recommend to the Department."  The Secretary provided a blank draft of what 
later became the "Seven Party Agreement" (see infra), and acknowledged that 
the state will have control over the final recommendation. 
3. Incorporation of Seven-Party Agreement
The fifth important exchange between state and federal authorities is 
the "Seven-Party Agreement."262  This document provided the formula for 
apportionment and recognition of priority uses of the Colorado River by 
California users until 2003.  Seven entities in Southern California, both 
agricultural and urban, addressed the California Division of Water Resources 
and specifically requested that it "recognize said apportionments and 
priorities in all matters relating to State authority and to recommend the 
provisions of Article I . . . ."263 
259. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, CONTRACTS FOR THE STORAGE OF WATER IN BOULDER 
CANYON RESERVOIR (1930), reprinted in THE HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS, supra note 256, app. 
1004, at A485. 
260. Letter of the Secretary of the Interior Requesting Recommendation of the
State in Effecting a Water Allocation (November 5, 1930), in THE HOOVER DAM
DOCUMENTS, supra note 258, app. 1002, at A477. 
261. Id.
262. Palo Verde Irrigation Dist. et al., Agreement Requesting the Division of
Water Resources of the State of California (Seven-Party Water Agreement) (August 
18, 1931), in THE HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS, supra note 256, app. 1003, at A479. 
263. Id.
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Article I establishes an exact allocation between seven priorities of 
use.  MWD received a fourth and fifth priority, each of 550,000 AFY,264 while 
San Diego gained an equal right in the fifth priority to its own 112,000 AFY.265  
Just as importantly, the standard of beneficial, consumptive use was 
identified as the measure of each right, which for lack of any express 
reference or definition, remains to be construed as established by 
California law.266 
California law was explicitly imported into and borrowed for federal 
authority.  Article I of the Seven-Party Agreement was adopted wholesale 
into the federal regulations,267 which were governed by provisions of both 
the 1902 Act and the BCPA.  The federal regulation adopting the Seven-Party 
Agreement provided the capstone of section 8 beneficial use limitations. 
Cooperative federalism functioned without hitch. 
4. 1932 Contract
The sixth major exchange in the administrative record is the water 
delivery contract between IID and the Secretary.268  The alternating back-and-
forth of state-federal cooperation established a pattern of deference and 
respect from both sides.  California contractors submitted the Seven-Party 
Agreement to their own state authority — the Division of Water Resources — 
which formally recommended that the Secretary adopt the intrastate 
allocation of water rights into federal regulations.  The Secretary obliged and 
utilized the regulations in the Colorado River apportionment contracts with 
each of the individual contractors.  At the outset, it did not appear that 
California had yielded any degree of state authority to control the use of 
Colorado River water within California. 
The contracts established a clear role for the Secretary as the operator 
of the infrastructure system in accord with the language of the BCPA.  Article 
2 of the 1932 Contract authorized the Secretary to "construct, operate, and 
maintain a dam and incidental works,"269 while article 5 of the 1931 Contract 
referenced the applicability of reclamation law and outlined the basic 
arrangement whereby revenues were to be collected by the Secretary to pay 
for "all expenses of construction, operation, and maintenance of the said 
264. Id. at A480.
265. Id.
266. Id. at A480-81.
267. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 259.
268. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Contract for Construction of Diversion Dam,
Main Canal, and Appurtenant Structures and for Delivery of Water (December 1, 
1932), in THE HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS, supra note 256, app. 1106, at A595. 
269. Id.
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diversion dam, main canal, and appurtenant structures."270  Article 8 of the 
1932 Contract governed the terms for transition of certain components of 
the conveyance system and the inheritance of costs.271 
In addition, Article 17 imported the Seven-Party Agreement and made 
an express allocation of each portion of California's 4.4 MAFY, again "in the 
amounts and with priorities in accordance with the recommendation of the 
Chief of the Division of Water Resources of the State of California." 272 
Article 24 of the 1932 Contract contained an express reservation to 
the right to prescribe and enforce rules and regulations not 
inconsistent with this contract, governing the diversion and 
delivery of water hereunder to the district and to other 
contractors.  Such rules and regulations may be modified, 
revised, and/or extended from time to time after notice to 
the district and opportunity for it to be heard, as may be 
deemed proper, necessary or desirable by the Secretary to 
carry out the true intent and meaning of the law and this 
contract, or amendments thereof, or to protect the interests 
of the United States.  The district hereby agrees that in the 
operation and maintenance of the Imperial Dam and All-
American Canal, all such rules and regulations will be fully 
adhered to.273 
Article 27 of the 1932 Contract referenced the agreement of the IID 
and the Secretary to resolve disputes or disagreements by arbitration or 
court proceedings.274 
Article 30 of the 1932 Contract summarized that reclamation law 
governs "the construction, operation, and maintenance of the works to be 
constructed hereunder" other than as provided by the BCPA.275 
The 1932 Contract governed IID's operations on the California side of 
the Lower Colorado for nearly seventy years with only minor modifications. 
Article 24 of the contract comprises IID's most substantial contractual grant 
of authority to BuRec recognizing that the Secretary has reserved authority 
to create rules and regulations for diversion and delivery.276  But this 
language does not provide the Secretary with authority contrary to the 1932 
270. Palo Verde Irrigation Dist. et. al, supra note 262.
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Contract, such as to reallocate IID's permanent water right or to adjudicate 
reasonable, beneficial use determinations contrary to the requirements of 
section 8 of the Reclamation Act.  Without having to second-guess whether 
it had accidentally given away the "keys to the kingdom" in the event of a 
contract dispute, Article 27 expressly secured for IID the ability to decode 
the "true intent and meaning of the law and this contract" through an 
independent third party. 
5. 43 C.F.R. Part 417
a. Federal Register Notices
In 1969, the Secretary opportunistically filled the partial vacuum of 
diminished state authority created in the wake of the Arizona decision.  The 
Secretary issued a seemingly innocuous notice in the Federal Register 
promulgating "new" procedures for Colorado River water delivery under 
contracts.277  These new procedures related to conservation practices in the 
"diversion, delivery, distribution, and use of the Colorado River" so that 
deliveries not "exceed that reasonably required for beneficial use."278  The 
Secretary's notice cited the BCPA, the contracts for the storage and delivery 
of Colorado River water made pursuant to the BCPA, and the Decree of the 
Supreme Court in Arizona as the enabling authorities for proposed Part 
417.279  In 1972, the Secretary posted an intermediate revision280 which,
again, cited the BCPA, the contracts and the Decree enabling authorities. 
Notably, none of the enabling sources contain an express 
authorization by Congress to the Secretary to act as a reasonable, beneficial 
use adjudicator.  These sources only authorized the Secretary to 
promulgate rules and regulations regarding entering permanent contracts 
for the delivery of Colorado River water.  Furthermore, these same 
authorities nowhere suggest that the Secretary could administratively 
adjudicate reasonable, beneficial use disputes with contractors or 
supplant the contractual provisions requiring arbitration or judicial 
resolution of any disputes. 
277. Procedural Methods for Implementing Colorado River Water
Conservation Measures, 34 Fed. Reg. 11499 (proposed July 11, 1969) (to be codified 
at 43 C.F.R. pt. 417). 
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Procedural Methods for Implementing Colorado River Water
Conservation Measures, 37 Fed. Reg. 18076 (proposed Sept. 7, 1972) (to be codified 
at 43 C.F.R. pt. 417). 
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b. Part 417 Textual Analysis
The Part 417.2 regulation language expressly ties water deliveries by 
the Secretary to a limit "reasonably required for beneficial use."281 
Part 417.3 then enunciates the first and only federal language that 
details the components of a "federal beneficial use": 
Following consultation with each Contractor and after 
consideration of all relevant comments and suggestions 
advanced by the Contractors in such consultations, the 
Regional Director will formulate his recommendations and 
determinations relating to the matters specified in §417.2. 
The recommendations and determinations shall, with 
respect to each Contractor, be based upon but not 
necessarily limited to such factors as the area to be 
irrigated, climatic conditions, location, land classifications, 
the kinds of crops raised, cropping practices, the type of 
irrigation system in use, the condition of water carriage and 
distribution facilities, record of water orders, and rejections 
of ordered water, general operating practices, the operating 
efficiencies and methods of irrigation of the water users, 
amount and rate of return flows to the river, municipal water 
requirements and the pertinent provisions of the Contractor's Boulder 
Canyon Project Act water delivery contract."282 
Part 417 applies to all valid contracts for the delivery of Colorado River 
water in the Lower Basin.  However, it does not apply to Indian uses (federal 
281. The Regional Director or his representative will, prior to the
beginning of each calendar year, arrange for and conduct such
consultations with each Contractor as the Regional Director may
deem appropriate as to the making by the Regional Director of
annual recommendations relating to water conservation measures
and operating practices in the diversion, delivery, distribution and
use of Colorado River water, and to the making by the Regional
Director of annual determinations of each Contractor's estimated
water requirements for the ensuing calendar year to the end that
deliveries of Colorado River water to each Contractor will not
exceed those reasonably required for beneficial use under the respective
Boulder Canyon Project Act contract or other authorization for use
of Colorado River water.
43 C.F.R. § 417.2 (2007). 
282. Id. § 417.3 (emphasis added).
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reserved rights)283 and the BuRec Director has express discretion to exclude 
municipal and industrial contractors from Part 417 review.284  In other words, 
Part 417 is primarily applicable to agricultural contractors.  Furthermore, it is 
worded as a "look ahead" prediction for the determination of allowed 
deliveries for the subsequent year. 
Under Part 417, delivery shall not exceed an amount "reasonably 
required for beneficial use."285  The standard for predicting each contractor's 
annual water delivery requirement is a nonexclusive standard loosely based 
on a variety of factors, including the "pertinent provisions" of the 
contractor's water delivery contract. 286 
In addition, Part 417 imparts no standing or participation by any other 
impacted right holder, nor does it provide for administrative adjudication 
due process procedures.  Contractors can only appeal BuRec Regional 
Director decisions to the Secretary, but the Secretary's decision is final 
without any neutral hearing.  Part 417 is an unconstitutional form of 
administrative adjudication. 
c. Part 417 Is Missing Essential Due
Process Protections
"Formal" and "informal" adjudications are not legal principles as such, 
but are terms of art to describe the application (or non-application) of 
certain aspects of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).287  "Formal" 
adjudication refers to those proceedings governed by § 554 of the APA.  That 
section applies to "every case of adjudication required by statute to be 
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing."288  It 
applies when a statute or agency regulation requires a hearing pursuant  to 
§ 554.  Section 554 contains numerous procedural requirements for any
"formal" agency hearing.
All other adjudications are governed by § 555 of the APA.  Therefore, 
all agency adjudications are "informal" unless otherwise required by 
statute.289  Part 417 is an informal adjudication.  No applicable statute or 
283. Id. § 417.1.
284. Id.
285. Id. § 417.2.
286. Id. § 417.3.
287. Administrative Procedures Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, and in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
288. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2008).
289. See, e.g., Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 361 n.37 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (informal adjudication is a "residual category including all agency actions that 
are not rulemaking and need not be conducted through on the record hearings"). 
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regulation requires application of § 554 of the APA to Secretarial 
determinations of beneficial use of Colorado River water, therefore § 555 of 
the APA governs. 
Informal adjudication under § 555 of the APA requires an agency to 
provide basic procedural safeguards.  The agency must: 
(a) allow any party appearing before it to be represented by an
attorney or other representative;
(b) permit the claimant to receive copies of any evidence submitted
against him;
(c) issue subpoenas on request; and
(d) provide prompt notice of the grounds of any denial of requested
relief.290
The requirement of due process exists above and beyond the 
requirements of the APA.  Satisfaction of the procedural requirements of the 
APA may still result in a court determination that the procedural compliance 
is inadequate to meet due process requirements.291 
The seminal test for whether an agency violated due process 
procedural requirements is found in Mathews v. Eldridge:292 
Due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical 
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place 
and circumstances. . . . Our prior decisions indicate that 
identification of the specific dictates of due process 
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail.293 
The due process test as articulated in Mathews applies independently of 
the APA.  If the agency's adjudication procedures fall short of what is 
required for due process, the agency's action is invalid.   The APA allows, in 
290. 5 U.S.C. § 555.
291. See, e.g., Hall v. Marion Sch. Dist. No. 2, 31 F.3d 183, 190-91 (4th Cir. 1994);
RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9.1 (4th ed. 2002). 
292. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
293. Id. at 335.
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§ 706(2)(B) and (D), a reviewing court to set aside agency action if it is
"contrary to constitutional light" or "without observance of procedure required
by law," including applicable constitutional due process requirements.294
The Ninth Circuit addressed due process issues in a line of cases 
regarding Interior recognition of the Samish Indian tribe.295  In Greene v. Lujan, 
the Department of the Interior determined by informal adjudication that the 
Samish were not a recognized tribe.296  The tribe challenged the conclusion, 
claiming procedures used to determine their tribal status did not afford 
them a hearing or an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and violated 
their due process rights under the Mathews balancing test.297  The district 
court ordered a full hearing with appropriate APA formal adjudication 
safeguards.298  Interior appealed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the 
informal adjudication procedures used by Interior violated due process.299 
The Greene v. Lujan opinion began by summarizing the procedural 
inadequacies outlined by the district court, including: 1) the inability to 
call witnesses; 2) no argument permitted before the decision was made; 3) 
denied access to all material evidence; and 4) lack of impartiality, 
including ex parte contacts and other indications that the issue may have 
been prejudged.300 
The Ninth Circuit then explained, "due process generally includes an 
opportunity for some type of hearing before the deprivation of a property 
interest, and . . . in almost every setting where important decisions turn on 
questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses."301  The Court described the importance of 
rights being litigated in such a case stating, "[i]nformal decision-making, 
behind closed doors and with an undisclosed record, is not an appropriate 
determination of matters of such gravity."302 
Part 417 as written, and as utilized by the Secretary violates due 
process standards.  As such, Part 417 should not be construed as a 
294. See, e.g., Greene v. Babbitt, 943 F. Supp. 1278, 1285 (W.D. Wash. 1996) ("Even
if there is 'substantial evidence' in the record for an agency finding, the court must 
set the finding aside if the agency failed to follow the 'procedures required by law' in 
making its determination."). 
295. Greene v. Lujan, 1992 WL 533059 (W.D. Wash. 1992), aff'd, 64 F.3d 1266 (9th
Cir. 1995). 
296. Id. at 1.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 8-9.
299. Greene v. Babbitt, 64 F.3d 1266, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 1995).
300. Id. at 1274.
301. Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970)).
302. Id. at 1275.
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regulation intended to authorize the BuRec or the Secretary to conduct 
reasonable, beneficial use adjudications because such adjudications affect 
important property interests. 
d. Historical Application of Part 417
Yet, prior to 2003, there was neither a single exercise of Part 417 
authority to find waste nor a correlating suit by a contractor challenging 
either the authority or application of the regulation.  In this time, BuRec 
approved all orders without a substitution of its own judgment or acting as 
an administrative tribunal.  Occasionally, contractors voluntarily complied 
with BuRec requests for resubmittal of modified water orders. 
e. 2003 Application of Part 417 to IID
In 2003, BuRec made its first Part 417 adjudication.  Peculiarly, the 
initial BuRec determination to refuse IID's requested water delivery 
preceded the actual Part 417 review.  Then, the formal Part 417 review was 
focused and restricted to a single agricultural contractor, IID, rather than to 
the entire class of agricultural contractors.  Native American and municipal 
users were also excluded from the scope of the review.  The Regional 
Director evaluated each of the listed Part 417.3 factors, but narrowly 
evaluated only such factors against the 2003 IID request for water, and 
unilaterally denied the IID order and imposed a water delivery reduction. 
The July 2003, BuRec Part 417 beneficial use determination did not 
acknowledge or recognize the 2002 SWRCB determination that the transfer 
of conserved water was a reasonable and beneficial use of water under state 
law. 303  Instead, BuRec ignored previously identified state evaluations of 
conservation, environmental impacts, and socio-economic factors in the 
reasonable, beneficial use analysis and narrowly determined that IID was 
inefficiently applying waters to its acreage and was wasting water in 
violation of the reasonable, beneficial use provision of its federal contract. 
In sum, IID was denied the benefit of its senior water rights under the 
priority provisions of both the 1931 Seven-Party Agreement and IID's 
subsequent 1932 water delivery contract.  By finding IID wasted water in 
violation of its federal contract, BuRec caused IID to forfeit part of its 
senior water right, which cascaded free of charge to the next junior water 
rights holders, CVWD and MWD.  As a result, the proposed state-
authorized transfer of IID water to CVWD and SDCWA in exchange for 
303. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 70; see also U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, supra note 68. 
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payments to fund conservation and environmental mitigation was 
thwarted by federal intervention.304 
The Regional Director selectively identified Articles 17, 24, and 30 of 
the 1932 IID water contract as "pertinent provisions," to the exclusion of all 
other articles also within the contract.  Most notably, the Regional Director 
ignored Article 27 for resolution of disputes or disagreements by "arbitration 
or court proceedings."  As applied, the "true intent and meaning" of both the 
law and the contract were administratively commandeered through a unique 
Part 417 process that violated IID's due process protections. 
There was no opportunity for a hearing, no ability to call or cross-
examine witnesses, no discovery rights, no opportunity to argue before a 
hearing, and no right to have the dispute resolved by a neutral third party. 
The Secretary used Part 417 to unilaterally diminish IID's water right without 
compensation; a suspect action that raises fundamental takings issues.305  
Part 417 does not include a guarantee of due process, provide a role for 
state participation or deference to state decisions. 
6. Limits on the Secretary's Regulatory Beneficial
Use Authority
Regulations promulgated by a federal administrative agency must not 
fall outside the authority conferred by Congress.  They must be rooted 
within a Congressional grant of power, conform to Congressional procedural 
requirements, and reasonably be within the contemplation of the 
authorizing statute. 
Regulations must also be consistent with congressional purpose.306  In 
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown307 the Supreme Court stated: 
The legislative power of the United States is vested in the 
Congress, and the exercise of quasi-legislative authority by 
governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a 
304. Coincidentally, the amount of water gained by MWD through this federal
review was approximately the same exact amount MWD was in jeopardy of losing as 
a result of California’s reduction of Colorado River water in excess of 4.4 MAF. 
305. The full development of this topic is beyond the scope of this Article.  See
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001); Klamath 
Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504 (2005); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United 
States, 75 Fed. Cl. 677 (2007). 
306. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-08 (1979); United States v.
Quincy-Columbia Basin Irrigation Dist., 649 F. Supp. 487, 490 (E.D. Wash. 1986); Zarr v. 
Barlow, 800 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986); Ryan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. United States, 
559 F.2d 554, 556 (9th Cir. 1977). 
307. 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
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grant of such power by the Congress and subject to limitations which 
that body imposes.308 
In addition, the regulations must have some nexus to the 
legislative authority.309  To determine whether a nexus exists, the 
Supreme Court has held that regulations must be reasonably within the 
contemplation of the statute: 
The pertinent inquiry is whether under any of the arguable 
statutory grants of authority the OFCCP [Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance Programs] disclosure regulations 
relied on by the respondents are reasonably within the 
contemplation of that grant of authority.310 
The nexus requirement is satisfied only when the grant of authority 
contemplates the regulations issued.  "What is important is that the 
reviewing court reasonably be able to conclude that the grant of authority 
contemplates the regulations issued."311 
a.  Ickes v. Fox
Ickes v. Fox312  and Fox v. Ickes313 both address the role of the Secretary in 
beneficial use decisions.  In 1906, the Sunnyside Water Users Association 
(the Association) entered into a contract with the United States regarding 
the reclamation of the waters of the Yakima River.314  Pursuant to this 
contract, the Association agreed that the aggregate amount of their water 
rights "should not exceed the number of acres of land capable of 
irrigation by the total quantity of water available."315  The parties also 
agreed that the Secretary should determine the number of acres capable 
of such irrigation, "'to be based upon and measured and limited by the 
beneficial use of water.'"316 
After execution of the contract, the Association applied for water rights 
for the irrigation of the lands involved.  By the terms of the applications, the 
308. Id. at 302 (emphasis added).
309. Id. at 304.
310. Id. at 305.
311. Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
312. 300 U.S. 82 (1937).
313. 137 F.2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
314. Ickes, 300 U.S. at 88-89.
315. Id. at 89.
316. Id.
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measure of the water right for the land "was stated to be that quantity which 
shall be beneficially used for the irrigation thereof, not exceeding the share 
proportionate to irrigable acreage of the water supply actually   
available. . . ."317 
The Supreme Court recognized that, pursuant to the Reclamation Act 
and the Association's contract with the Secretary, the Secretary had been 
making factual determinations regarding the association's beneficial use 
of water: 
[T]hereafter the successive Secretaries of the Interior
uniformly construed the Reclamation Act and the
contractual obligations, to the effect that the owners of the lands
had purchased a sufficient quantity of water to beneficially and
successfully irrigate their lands, to be determined by representatives of
the Secretary having physical charge of the water distribution,
from a factual investigation and personal examination of the lands and
the crops growing thereon and the water requirements thereof.
. . .
Pursuant thereto, it was determined by representatives of
the successive Secretaries that 4.84 acre-feet of water per
annum was necessary to beneficially and successfully
irrigate respondents' lands . . . .318 
In response to a water shortage in 1930, the Secretary proposed the 
construction of a new reservoir to supply water to the project.319  The 
Secretary notified the water users that they would be deprived of all water in 
excess of three acre-feet unless they made applications for additional water 
at new rates.  The water users refused320 and sued the Secretary.  The 
Supreme Court noted that the Secretary's new three acre-foot limit was a 
digression from the Secretary's historical 4.84 AF determinations, which 
were based upon the users' historical beneficial use of water: 
Under the Reclamation Act, . . . as well as under the law of 
Washington, "beneficial use" was "the basis, the measure 
and the limit of the right."  And by the express terms of the 
contract made between the government and the Water 
Users Association in behalf of respondents and other 
shareholders, the determination of the Secretary as to the number of 
acres capable of irrigation was "to be based upon and measured and 
317. Id. at 90.
318. Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
319. Id. at 92; Fox, 137 F.2d at 31.
320. Ickes, 300 U.S. at 92-93; Fox, 137 F.2d at 31.
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limited by the beneficial use of water."  Predecessors of petitioner, 
accordingly, had decided that 4.84 acre-feet of water per 
annum per acre was necessary to the beneficial and 
successful irrigation of respondents' lands; and upon that 
decision, for a period of more than twenty years prior to the 
wrongs complained of, there was delivered to and used 
upon the lands that quantity of water.321 
After the Supreme Court determined the United States was not an 
indispensable party,322 the suit went back to the district court.  The district 
court found that the Secretary's new charges for water in excess of three acre-
feet were proper; however, the appellate court, in Fox v. Ickes, reversed because 
the landowners' rights were based not on contract but on beneficial use: 
In holding that appellants' rights were dependent on the 
enforcement of contracts with the United States, we think 
the trial court failed to follow the decision in Ickes v. Fox, 
decided by the Supreme Court in a previous appeal in these 
proceedings. . . .  the Supreme Court held that the rights of 
applicants were not limited to the enforcement of any 
contract with the government.  The opinion said:  "Under 
the Reclamation Act, . . . as well as under the law of 
Washington, 'beneficial use' was 'the basis, the measure, and the 
limit of the right.' 
. . . Appropriation was made not for the use of the 
government, but, under the Reclamation Act, for the use of 
the landowners . . . . 
. . . . 
Reading the Reclamation Act in the light of the decision in 
Ickes v. Fox, we find the situation in this case to be as 
follows: The water-rights of appellants are not determined by contract 
but by beneficial use.323 
Most importantly, the Court explained that even in the case where the 
Secretary was expressly given certain beneficial use authority by contract 
(unlike on the Colorado River), the Secretary's beneficial use evaluations 
were afforded "tentative" status, and the trial court was the ultimate 
decision-maker as to beneficial use as defined by state law: 
321. Ickes, 300 U.S. at 94 (emphasis added).
322. Id. at 96.
323. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
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The amount of water to which appellants are entitled by 
reason of prior appropriations for beneficial use can only be 
finally determined by a court of the State of Washington.  However, 
when the Secretary decides that there is surplus water 
available which can be delivered to appellants without 
violating the rights of others, he must make a tentative 
determination of appellants' rights.324 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court refused to allow the Secretary to 
implement the new charges.325 
b.  Central Arizona Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. Lujan
In Central Arizona Irrigation & Drainage District v. Lujan,326 a federal district 
court cleanly distinguished the Secretary's ability to allocate Colorado River 
water and the aspect of Colorado River water use controlled by state law: 
The allocation and preferences given to CAP [Central 
Arizona Project] water seems to be within the exclusive 
province of the Secretary of the Interior; once the 
preferences are already established, the possible uses of that 
water are governed by state law. Consequently, the Secretary of 
the Interior is authorized to allocate CAP water to M & I 
users. Then M & I users may use their water for any use 
authorized by Arizona law, including recharge.327 
7. Conclusion: Part 417 as Implied Federal Authority
In the 2003 IID v. U.S. litigation, the Secretary relied on section 5 of the 
BCPA authority for federal beneficial use preemption.  Part 417 may not 
exceed the authority authorized by the BCPA or contract.  Congress did not 
expressly grant the Secretary the power to adjudicate reasonable beneficial 
use or venture into California for purposes of reallocating water 
appropriations or distributions among California users.  After California, 
Arizona cannot credibly support any implied Part 417 usurpation of the 
traditional state domain of intrastate reasonable beneficial use. 
While the discretionary authority of the Secretary was left open by the 
Arizona Court in times of shortage, no such powers exist under either surplus 
324. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
325. Id. at 35-36.
326. 764 F. Supp. 582 (D. Az. 1991).
327. Id. at 591.
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or normal conditions.328  While certain aspects of California's sluggish 
response to over a decade of federal efforts to limit California's total 
aggregate use may deserve critique, the fact of the matter is that 
the Secretary declared 2003 a normal year on the Colorado River.  The 
only authorized option available to the Secretary was to cap California 
at 4.4 MAF. 
New Mexico affirmed the presumption of state sovereignty and 
unambiguously enunciated a judicial reluctance to expand implied federal 
authorities to new purposes beyond those expressed in the particular 
enabling act.  Part 417 does not align with the strict purposes of the BCPA if 
used as a substitute for state definition and procedure.  Accordingly, any 
extension of implied authority must comply with state beneficial, reasonable 
use law. 
At a minimum, the judiciary is left to determine disputes involving 
beneficial use, not the Secretary.  Even in a case such as Ickes, where the 
Secretary was granted a beneficial use role by express contractual provisions, 
the Secretary's decisions were merely tentative and not binding on a court. 
Part 417 lacks any statutory or judicial underpinning if utilized to usurp the 
proper deference accorded to state reasonable, beneficial use law and the 
resolution of reasonable, beneficial use disputes by the judiciary. 
Other states have also supported state sovereignty in making 
beneficial, reasonable use determinations of Colorado River water.  For 
example, both in the litigation surrounding Arizona v. California, and in the 
recent dispute over California's use of Arizona's Colorado River entitlement, 
Arizona never argued for federal usurpation of California's determination of 
beneficial, reasonable use.  The proper reach of the Arizona holding should 
be read to support the narrow purpose of the BCPA: to achieve a 4.4 MAFY 
cap on California's consumption and to funnel all interstate allocations of 
Colorado River water through formal section 5 contracts.  Arizona would 
agree with this conclusion. 
Some suggest that the federal use of Part 417 was a pragmatic and 
necessary political prod to move California agencies towards QSA execution. 
Others claim that California should not be read to limit the BCPA or Arizona.  
328. Arizona carefully staked out an additional yard of turf for the
Secretary in times of “shortage”, which is one of three formal
standard choices the Secretary can make each year through his or
her Annual Operating Plan while determining the status of water
supply in the entire Colorado system.  For purposes of this
analysis, it will be noted that the Secretary noted that 2003 was
not a “surplus” or “shortage” year, but rather a “normal” year, thus
muting the relevance of this authority in times of drought. 373
U.S. at 594.
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So long as the BCPA is controlled by the Reclamation Act, Arizona cannot 
escape the full impact of California. 
In the event of a reasonable, beneficial use dispute, the SWRCB and 
each of the Colorado River right holders within California had available 
procedural avenues to enforce the reasonable, beneficial use obligations of 
each right holder.  Any California intrastate dispute about how to divide the 
4.4 MAFY from the Colorado in a normal year was controlled by existing 
water right priorities, subject to California reasonable, beneficial use laws; 
federal intrusion was not required, and no federal purpose was served.  The 
use of Part 417 must therefore be considered an invalid extension of implied 
federal authority not supported by law. 
E. Federal Preemption Conclusion
We are mindful, in deciding whether later federal law overrides 
inconsistent state law, that we may not seek out conflicts between state 
and federal regulation where none clearly exists.329 
There is neither express nor clearly implied congressional intent to 
support the federal allegation that Part 417 preempts California's beneficial 
use sovereignty.  The federal government carries the burden of proof when 
attempting to wrest reasonable, beneficial use jurisdiction from the states. 
When evaluated against Congressional authorities and the express language 
of section 8 of the Reclamation Act, there is no express or implied authority 
granting the Secretary discretion to intrude on the jurisdiction of California 
recognized and protected so forcefully in California. 
Federal utilization of Part 417 to administratively adjudicate intrastate 
reasonable, beneficial use and usurp the authority of the SWRCB is the 
same issue addressed in California.  The federal position in the IID v. U.S. 
litigation argued that Part 417 preempted any California reasonable, 
beneficial use determinations and left no role for California.  This position is 
directly contravened by California.  Again, California holds that "a state 
limitation or condition on the federal management or control of a federally 
financed water project is valid unless it clashes with express or clearly 
implied congressional intent or works at cross-purposes with an important 
federal interest served by the congressional scheme."330  California and New 
Mexico lend a sobering perspective to the full scope of federal water 
authority.  Judicial opinions and the Law of the River must be interpreted for 
their clear and plain meaning.  No source authorizes the Secretary to wander 
into the realm of intrastate reasonable, beneficial use adjudications in 
usurpation of state adjudicatory bodies.  Section 5 BCPA contract authority 
329. United States v. California, 694 F.2d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 1982).
330. Id. at 1177.
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raises no express or implied conflicts to support the Secretary's usurpation 
of state reasonable, beneficial use authority. 
There is no instance of California legislative, judicial, or administrative 
authority that conflicts with federal purposes in the realm of reasonable, 
beneficial use.  California reasonable, beneficial use regulation,331 which has 
a much broader scope332 than Part 417, broadly defines domestic,333 
municipal,334 and irrigation335 uses, but it is nonetheless consistent with 
federal purposes.  While consistency can be partially attributed to the 
shallow sources of federal authority regarding reasonable, beneficial use 
meaning or enforcement, the federal silence is also evidence of deference to 
the long-standing supremacy of state water law reinforced by California.  With 
its fertile agricultural lands and high productivity, California has often 
331. "Beneficial Use of Water:  Beneficial use of water includes those uses
defined in this subarticle.  The board will determine whether other uses of water are 
beneficial when considering individual applications to appropriate water."  CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 23, § 659 (2008). 
332. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 660 (2008) (Domestic Uses); CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
23, § 661 (2008) (Irrigation Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 662 (2008) (Power Use); 
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 662.5 (2008) (Frost Protection Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, 
§ 663 (2008) (Municipal Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 664 (2008) (Mining Use); CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 665 (2008) (Industrial Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 666 (2008)
(Fish and Wildlife Preservation and Enhancement Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 667
(2008) (Aquaculture Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 667.5 (2008) (Fish and Wildlife
Protection and Enhancement); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 668 (2008) (Recreational
Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 668.5 (2008) (Water Quality Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
23, § 669 (2008) (Stockwatering Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 669.5 (2008) (Name
and Address of Applicant); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 670 (2008) (Water Quality Use);
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 670.5 (2008) (Supplement to Application May Be Required);
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 670.6 (2008) (Instream Beneficial Use Assessment); CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 671 (2008) (Frost Protection Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 672
(2008) (Heat Control Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 673 (2008) (General
Requirements); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 674 (2008) (Requirements).
333. Domestic use means the use of water in homes, resorts, motels,
organization camps, camp grounds, etc., including the incidental watering of 
domestic stock for family sustenance or enjoyment and the irrigation of not to 
exceed one-half acre in lawn, ornamental shrubbery, or gardens at any single 
establishments.  The use of water at a camp ground or resort for human 
consumption, cooking or sanitary purposes is a domestic use. 
334. Municipal use means the use of water for the municipal water supply of a
city, town, or other similar population group, and use incidental thereto for any 
beneficial purpose. 
335. Irrigation use includes any application of water to the production of
irrigated crops or the maintenance of large areas of lawns, shrubbery, or gardens. 
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pioneered the development of reasonable, beneficial use law.  It must be left 
with no less than the full rights reserved to and accorded all states by the 
Constitution in the federal system.  Without a conflict, federal law cannot 
preempt state law. 
Since California, federal courts have reestablished state supremacy over 
beneficial use determinations.  In United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co.336 
the Secretary sought to modify the Nevada State Engineer's determination 
awarding local irrigators an amount of water historically applied towards 
growing alfalfa so that the difference in flow could be applied as a federally 
reserved water right to forest lands much like that in U.S. v. New Mexico.  The 
Secretary argued that the beneficial standard of usefulness for irrigated 
water should be in proportion to a fixed yield, which would allow excess 
water to be diverted as water use efficiency increased. 
The court concluded that the federal projections of an enhanced water 
yield were made under optimized conditions, which would not be actualized 
and that the farmers' use of the water and the techniques for growing alfalfa 
were reasonable.  Ultimately, the court decided that "the conspicuous 
absence of transfer procedures, taken in conjunction with the clear general 
deference to state water law, impels the conclusion that Congress intended 
transfers to be subject to state water law.'"337  Furthermore, the Court 
announced "beneficial use itself was intended by Congress to be governed 
by state law,"338 and that "[w]hile there were provisions of federal law which 
were intended to displace state law, such as the 160-acre limit . . . beneficial 
use itself was intended to be governed by state law."339 
The court further acknowledged the differences in water law between 
western states, yet found two general rules of beneficial use common to all. 
Waste does not accommodate "unreasonable transmission loss and use of 
cost-ineffective methods," while unreasonableness requires evaluation of 
"alternative uses of the water."340  The Court summarized state beneficial use 
law as a "dynamic concept," evolving through time as conditions change.341 
Alpine has important bearing on IID v. U.S. in two vital respects.  First, 
is the similar nature of the government calculus used to determine that a 
portion of agricultural water is not yielding maximum efficiency, despite the 
fact that the water is being reasonably used.  The Alpine court deflected the 
federal attempt to pry water away from an established reasonable and 
beneficial use.  Per the SWRCB determination, IID's transfer of conserved 
336. 697 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1983).
337. Id. at 858.
338. Id. at 854.
339. Id. (citing 35 CONG. REC. 6677 (1907) (statement of Rep. Mondell); 35 CONG. 
REC. 2222 (1907) (statement of Sen. Clark); California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978)). 
340. 697 F.2d at 854.
341. Id. at 855.
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water was both beneficial and reasonable.  While Part 417 makes no 
determination that directly confronts the reasonableness of the water 
transfer, it identifies the inefficiency of applied water.  Like Alpine, Part 417 
utilizing idealized water efficiency models lacks federal transfer procedures 
and also lacks federal analysis or procedures related to the assessment of 
reasonableness in connection with a proposed voluntary water transfer. 
State law should be afforded full berth to effectuate its own beneficial use 
determinations related to water transfers. 
Second, is the disposition of the court in regard to the authority of the 
Nevada State Engineer.  The court imported the relatively newly minted rule 
from California and declared "[f]undamental principles of federalism require 
the national government to consult state processes and weigh state 
substantive law in shaping and defining a federal water policy."342  Within the 
IID litigation, there is little evidence of BuRec's effort to consider state policy. 
Nevada v. United States343 provides additional authority that limits an 
extension of federal control over state beneficial use determinations.  The 
Nevada Court considered the general nature of federal intrusion upon state 
water rights and concluded, "[w]e are bound to say that the Government's 
position, if accepted, would do away with half a century of decided case law 
relating to the Reclamation Act of 1902 and water rights in the public 
domain of the West."344  In a scolding tone the court added: 
In the light of these cases, we conclude that the 
Government is completely mistaken if it believes that the 
water rights confirmed to it by the Orr Ditch decree in 1944 
for use in irrigating lands within the Newlands Reclamation 
Project were like so many bushels of wheat, to be bartered, 
sold, or shifted about as the Government might see fit. 
Once these lands were acquired by settlers in the Project, the 
Government's "ownership" of the water rights was at most 
nominal; the beneficial interest in the rights confirmed to the 
Government resided in the owners of the land within the 
Project to which these water rights became appurtenant 
upon the application of Project water to the land.  As in Ickes 
v. Fox and Nebraska v. Wyoming, the law of relevant State and
the contracts entered into by the landowners and the United
States make this point very clear.345
342. Id.
343. 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
344. Id. at 121.
345. Id. at 126.
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Any legal interpretation giving the Secretary authority to disregard 
state dominion over reasonable, beneficial use must be met with skepticism. 
Part 417 has no basis in Congressional authority to overrule state 
reasonable, beneficial use sovereignty. 
III. Federal Violation of the 1932 Water Delivery Contract
A separate and independent legal flaw in addition to the erroneous 
claim of federal preemption by Part 417 is the direct violation of the 
provisions of the 1932 United States contract with IID. 
A. BuRec Authority to Contract
As noted above, section5 of the BCPA authorized the Secretary to enter 
permanent contracts for delivery of Colorado River water.  Early Regulations 
and the creation of the Seven-Party Agreement culminated in the 1932 
contract346 between IID and the United States. 
B. 1932 Water Delivery Contract
Under the contract, IID is required to put its water to reasonable, 
beneficial use. Article 17 states, "said water shall be delivered as ordered 
by the District, and as reasonably required for potable and irrigation   
purposes . . .."  The Contract does not define what "reasonably required" 
means.  IID asserted that its 2002 uses and its 2003 water order were in 
amounts reasonably required, while BuRec flatly asserted the contrary. 
Thus, a dispute arose as to the interpretation of and compliance with the 
Contract's language. 
Another Contract provision requires use of a court, or an agreed upon 
arbitration panel, to decide all disputes arising under the contract.  Article 
27 states that "[d]isputes or disagreements as to the interpretation or 
performance of the provisions of this contract, except as otherwise provided 
herein, shall be determined either by arbitration or court proceedings."347 
The Secretary's asserted authority in making unilateral reasonable, 
beneficial use decisions contravenes the clear language of the Contract.  By 
the Contract's terms, any dispute over reasonable, beneficial use must be 
resolved by a court, unless the parties have mutually agreed to utilize 
arbitration.  Adoption of a regulation cannot amend the 1932 Contract. 
346. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 266.
347. Id. at art. 27, A612.
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The United States must honor the terms and provisions of its 
contracts.  As stated in United States v. Coachella Valley County Water District:348 
A contract is a contract, regardless of whether it is made 
between individuals or between individual and a 
government agency; and if made with an agency, the latter 
should not have the right to change any of terms of the duly 
executed and partially performed contract.349 
In addition, colorful, yet penetrating language cuts straight to the 
current issue: 
"Legal obligations that exist but cannot be enforced are 
ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to the 
grasp."  Certainly when the contract in question was signed 
by the irrigation district, the members were not grasping a 
ghost which could elusively slip through their fingers or 
change its character at the whim of a government official.350 
The general language of the Reclamation Act and BCPA authorizes the 
Secretary to "perform any and all acts and to make such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary and proper." However, nothing within the 
authorizing language intimates that a subsequent regulation adopted years 
later, Part 417, empowers the Secretary to undo the Contract between IID 
and BuRec. 
IV. Overall Conclusion
Part 417 is only consistent with the intended congressional role for the 
Secretary if it’s used to determine whether or not there is a valid dispute 
regarding a Colorado River contractor's compliance with its contractual 
obligation to order water reasonably required for beneficial use.  Part 417 is 
valid if limited solely to identify the Secretary's position on a contractor's 
348. United States v. Coachella Valley County Water Dist., 111 F. Supp. 172, 180
(S.D.Cal. 1953). 
349. See also Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Se., Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S.
604, 607 (2000) ("'When the United States enters into contract relations, its rights 
and duties therein are governed generally by the law applicable to contracts between 
private individuals.'"); Hi-Shear Tech. Corp. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 418, 421 (2003) 
("[W]hen the United States enters contracts, its rights and duties are governed by the 
laws applicable to private parties."). 
350. 111 F. Supp. at 180.
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use of water.  It is invalid to the extent that it attempts to substantively 
resolve disputes over beneficial, reasonable use. 
Application of Part 417 to adjudicate IID reasonable beneficial use in 
2003 was an unprecedented federal attempt to exert control over established 
state domain.  If allowed to stand as a valid extension of federal authority, 
the ripple of an enlarged and aggressive federal posture in the dominion of 
reasonable, beneficial use will send a profound jolt to the core of western 
states' rights.  States such as California have painstakingly balanced 
competing political interests through reasonable, beneficial use doctrine. 
This delicate balance should not be subject to the inconsistent whim of 
unfettered federal meddling under the Reclamation Act.  This would upend a 
century of federal deference to state reasonable, beneficial use 
determinations.  It would invariably upset the delicately woven balance 
between urban, agricultural, and environmental interests reliant on the 
Colorado River. 
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APPENDIX: 43 C.F.R. Part 417 
Title 43— Public Lands: Interior 
Chapter I—Bureau of Reclamation Department of the Interior 
Part 417—Procedural Methods for Implementing Colorado River Water 
Conservation Measures with Lower Basin Contractors and Others 
§ 417.1 Scope of part.
The procedures established in this part shall apply to every public or 
private organization (herein termed ‘‘Contractor’’) in Arizona, California, or 
Nevada which, pursuant to the Boulder Canyon Project Act or to provisions 
of other Reclamation Laws, has a valid contract for the delivery of Colorado 
River water, and to Federal establishments other than Indian Reservations 
enumerated in Article II(D) of the March 9, 1964, Decree of the Supreme 
Court of the United States in the case of ‘‘Arizona v. California et al.’’, 376 
U.S. 340 (for purposes of this part each such Federal establishment is 
considered as a ‘‘Contractor’’), except that (a) neither this part nor the term 
‘‘Contractor’’ as used herein shall apply to any person or entity which has a 
contract for the delivery or use of Colorado River water made pursuant to 
the Warren Act of February 21, 1911 (36 Stat. 925) or the Miscellaneous 
Purposes Act of February 25, 1920 (41 Stat. 451), (b) Contractors and 
permittees for small quantities of water, as determined by the Regional 
Director, Bureau of Reclamation, Boulder City, Nev. (herein termed 
‘‘Regional Director’’), and Contractors for municipal and industrial water 
may be excluded from the application of these procedures at the discretion 
of the Regional Director, and (c) procedural methods for implementing 
Colorado River water conservation measures on Indian Reservations will be 
in accordance with § 417.5 of this part 
§ 417.2 Consultation with contractors.
The Regional Director or his representative will, prior to the beginning 
of each calendar year, arrange for and conduct such consultations with each 
Contractor as the Regional Director may deem appropriate as to the making 
by the Regional Director of annual recommendations relating to water 
conservation measures and operating practices in the diversion, delivery, 
distribution and use of Colorado River water, and to the making by the 
Regional Director of annual determinations of each Contractor’s estimated 
water requirements for the ensuing calendar year to the end that deliveries 
of Colorado River water to each Contractor will not exceed those reasonably 
required for beneficial use under the respective Boulder Canyon Project Act 
contract or other authorization for use of Colorado River water. 
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§ 417.3 Notice of recommendations and determinations.
Following consultation with each Contractor and after consideration of 
all relevant comments and suggestions advanced by the Contractors in such 
consultations, the Regional Director will formulate his recommendations 
and determinations relating to the matters specified in § 417.2. The 
recommendations and determinations shall, with respect to each 
Contractor, be based upon but not necessarily limited to such factors as the 
area to be irrigated, climatic conditions, location, land classifications, the 
kinds of crops raised, cropping practices, the type of irrigation system in 
use, the condition of water carriage and distribution facilities, record of 
water orders, and rejections of ordered water, general operating practices, 
the operating efficiencies and methods of irrigation of the water users, 
amount and rate of return flows to the river, municipal water requirements 
and the pertinent provisions of the Contractor’s Boulder Canyon Project Act 
water delivery contract. The Regional Director shall give each Contractor 
written notice by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, of his 
recommendations and determinations. If the recommendations and 
determinations include a reduction in the amount of water to be delivered, 
as compared to the calendar year immediately preceding, the notice shall be 
delivered to the Contractor or timely sent by registered or certified mail, 
return receipt requested, so that it may reasonably be delivered at least 30 
days prior to the first date water delivery would be affected thereby, and 
shall specify the basis for such reduction including any pertinent factual 
determinations. The recommendations and determinations of the Regional 
Director shall be final and conclusive unless, within 30 days of the date of 
receipt of the notice, the Contractor submits his written comments and 
objections to the Regional Director and requests further consultation. If, 
after such further consultation, timely taken, the Regional Director does not
modify his recommendations and determinations and so advises the 
Contractor in writing, or if modifications are made but the Contractor still 
feels aggrieved thereby after notification in writing of such modified 
recommendations and determinations, the Contractor may, before 30 days 
after receipt of said notice, appeal to the Secretary of the Interior. During the 
pendency of such appeal, and until disposition thereof by the Secretary, the 
recommendations and determinations formulated by the Regional Director 
shall be of no force or effect. In the event delivery of water is scheduled prior 
to the new recommendations and determinations becoming final, said 
delivery shall be made according to the Contractor’s currently proposed 
schedule or to the schedules approved for the previous calendar year, 
whichever is less.
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§ 417.4 Changed conditions, emergency, or hardship modifications.
A Contractor may at any time apply in writing to the Regional Director 
for modification of recommendations or determinations deemed necessary 
because of changed conditions, emergency, or hardship. Upon receipt of 
such written application identifying the reason for such requested 
modification, the Regional Director shall arrange for consultation with the 
Contractor with the objective of making such modifications as he may deem 
appropriate under the then existing conditions. The Regional Director may 
initiate efforts for further consultation with any Contractor on his own 
motion with the objective of modifying previous recommendations and 
determinations, but in the event such modifications are made, the 
Contractor shall have the same opportunity to object and appeal as 
provided in § 417.3 of this part for the initial recommendations and 
determinations. The Regional Director shall afford the fullest practicable 
opportunity for consultation with a Contractor when acting under this 
section. Each modification under this section shall be transmitted to the 
Contractor by letter. 
§ 417.5 Duties of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs with respect to
Indian reservations. 
(a) The Commissioner of Indian Affairs (herein termed
‘‘Commissioner’’) will engage in consultations with various tribes and other 
water users on the Indian Reservations listed in Article II (D) of said 
Supreme Court Decree, similar to those engaged in by the Regional Director 
with regard to Contractors as provided in § 417.2 of this part. After 
consideration of all comments and suggestions advanced by said tribes and 
other water users on said Indian Reservations concerning water 
conservation measures and operating practices in the diversion, delivery, 
distribution and use of Colorado River water, the Commissioner shall, within 
the limits prescribed in said decree, make a determination as to the 
estimated amount of water to be diverted for use on each Indian Reservation 
covered by the above decree. Said determination shall be made prior to the 
beginning of each calendar year. That determination shall be based upon, 
but not necessarily limited to, such factors as: The area to be irrigated, 
climatic conditions, location, land classifications, the kinds of crops raised, 
cropping practices, the type of irrigation system in use, the condition of 
water carriage and distribution facilities, record of water orders, and 
rejections of ordered water, general operating practices, the operating 
efficiencies and methods of irrigation of the tribes and water users on each 
reservation, the amount and rate of return flows to the river, municipal water 
requirements, and other uses on the reservation. The Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs shall deliver to the Regional Director written notice of the 
amount of water to be diverted for use upon each Indian Reservation for 
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each year 60 days prior to the beginning of each calendar year and the basis 
for said determination. The determination of the Commissioner shall be 
final and conclusive unless within 30 days of the date of receipt of such 
notice the Regional Director submits his written comments and objections 
to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and requests further consultation. If 
after such further consultation, timely taken, the Commissioner does not 
modify his determination and so advises the Regional Director in writing or 
if modifications are made by the Commissioner but the Regional Director 
still does not agree therewith, the Regional Director may, within 30 days 
after receipt of the Commissioner’s response, appeal to the Secretary of the 
Interior for a decision on the matter. During the pendency of such appeal 
and until disposition thereof by the Secretary, water deliveries will be made 
to the extent legally and physically available according to the 
Commissioner’s determination or according to the Commissioner’s 
determination for the preceding calendar year, whichever is less. 
(b) Modifications of said determinations due to changed conditions,
emergency or hardship may be made by the Commissioner, subject, 
however, to the right of the Regional Director to appeal to the Secretary, as 
provided in the case of an initial determination by the Commissioner. 
During the pendency of such an appeal, water deliveries will be made on the 
basis of the initial determination. 
§ 417.6 General regulations.
In addition to the recommendations and determinations formulated 
according to the procedures set out above, the right is reserved to issue 
regulations of general applicability to the topics dealt with herein. 
